



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JUNE 1982

MOBILIZATION PROCESSING OF UNTRAINED MANPOWER

by

COLONEL HERBERT E. LANGENDORFF, JR.
MILITARY POLICE CORPS

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


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
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Item 20. Continued

In the process, other implications of mobilization processing were examined, i.e., transportation, revitalization of the Selective Service System, determination of service requirements for untrained manpower, and the need for mobilization policy and guidance.

The study concludes with a series of recommendations for improving mobilization processing procedures.



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

MOBILIZATION PROCESSING OF UNTRAINED MANPOWER

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

BY

COLONEL HERBERT F. LANGENDORFF, JR.
MILITARY POLICE CORPS

1 JUNE 1982

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→ This study centers primarily on the three steps and responsible agencies in the processing of untrained manpower during mobilization: Induction and the Selective Service System; military service qualification and the US Military Enlistment Processing Command and its 67 Military Entrance Processing Stations; and processing for Initial Entry Training at Service Reception Stations. Each step and agency was examined to assess the adequacy of mobilization procedures and capabilities.

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→ The study concludes with a series of recommendations for improving mobilization processing procedures.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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This project reflects the insight, experience and cooperation of a number of individuals who gave generously of their time to contribute to the research and analysis.

While impractical to identify all contributors, the following organizations deserve recognition for consenting to have members of their organizations interviewed during the course of the study: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics; Headquarters, Department of the Army; Military Traffic Management Command; Selective Service System; and US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Transcripts of these interviews are on file with this paper in the US Army War College Library.

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Major Francis A. Ritchey, USMC, Operations and Plans
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6.	Interview Transcript with Mr. Don Skinner, Office of Director of Training, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (USAWC Library)	
7.	Interview Transcript with Mr. Smoky Bresser, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Mr. Wayne Spruel, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Department of the Army (USAWC Library) . .	

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the critical components of a military capability to project power in support of national policy is manpower resources.

Background

The focus over the past decade, since the demise of the draft, has been on recruiting and retaining sufficient personnel to make the All Volunteer Force a viable reality. The active force tooth-to-tail controversy placed a greater reliance on the Reserve Components to provide the combat support and especially the combat service support units — thus the advent of the Total Force Concept. With such a heavy reliance on reserve component forces to fulfill wartime requirements, mobilization and deployment became the central themes of mobilization exercises, which first commenced in 1976.

Mobilization consists of several elements: assimilating reserve component units into the active force structure, posturing the nation's industrial base to support a war effort (often considered to be an element of total mobilization), and sustaining manpower requirements by the accession of untrained civilian personnel into the training base.

This study will focus on the process of accessing untrained civilian manpower into the military services under mobilization conditions. Since late 1979, the attitude towards this aspect of mobilization can be

described three ways: "the lone voice in the wilderness"; "paying lip service"; and "enthusiasm and involvement at all echelons." Three years ago, many agencies did not want to bother with a problem which did not affect current day actions. This was followed by some concern but little action. However, this past year there seems to have been significant progress made in this aspect of mobilization within many agencies — and the progress is marked with enthusiasm and involvement.

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this military study was to make a comprehensive assessment of the mobilization processing capability for new accessions by examining the interface of the three essential elements of the processing system -- Selective Service, US Military Enlistment Processing Command, and the service reception stations/training centers. For this study, the Army was chosen as the recipient of the qualified manpower, since it has by far the largest mobilization requirement.

Previous studies have examined various aspects of the processing procedure and it was suggested that a similar approach might be more feasible for this effort. However, I felt someone needed to identify and provide a critical review of the interrelations of the processing procedure and to identify and highlight continuing problem areas. Once identified, to present solutions towards their resolution.

The induction of personnel to satisfy service mobilization requirements involves the close coordination of a number of agencies/organizations. This study presents an overview of the various facets of mobilization processing from the conduct of a national lottery and subsequent issuance of induction notices by Selective Service, through the qualification process, to the processing of the inductees at Army Reception

Stations/Training Centers. Requirements of other services were viewed from the impact that they have on the total process even though the bulk of the workload supports Army requirements. The study did not examine every aspect of the mobilization process in detail, since to do so would only duplicate other work or studies being performed; however, some aspects are referenced to gain an understanding and appreciation for the interrelations involved. It was my perception at the initiation of the study that various aspects of mobilization planning were being done in too much isolation and inconsistencies were difficult to surface for resolution. The study attempts to summarize the various efforts underway and to relate them to the whole process.

Investigative Procedures

A brief historical search was performed of World War II draft and induction procedures, which was the last time that comparable levels of workload were processed under mobilization conditions. However, the number of procedural changes which have occurred hold little applicability to the past.

Written materials from various agencies/organizations involved in mobilization were reviewed for possible conflict as well as completeness in accomplishing processing requirements. The mobilization plans of US Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPOCOM), the US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), and the Raleigh (North Carolina) Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) were reviewed. A final draft copy of Chapter 9 (Processing of Selective Service Registrants), Army Regulation 601-270 which is a joint service regulation on MEPS Operations, was reviewed. Various government contracted studies on mobilization were also reviewed as were publications of Selective Service and materials

utilized by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in their core course on mobilization.

Interviews were conducted to gain a current insight into mobilization processing when either a void existed in written material or the material appeared outdated. Agencies whose representatives consented to interviews included: Selective Service System (SSS); US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) and Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS), Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA); Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (ASD (MRA&L)); and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). A series of written questions were submitted to MEPOCOM and written responses were received.

Phase I, Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD was observed at the Raleigh MEPS on 1 May 1982. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) volunteers were processed by the MEPS to simulate a single shift mobilization processing operation. The study plan envisioned that Phase II involving Reception Station operations would be observed. However, when the Exercise was postponed from December 1981 to February 1982 and then until 14-16 May 1982 a determination was made that insufficient time was available to properly assess any observations and include the results in this paper.

Organization of the Study

Chapter II examines the process for determining the number of inductees required upon mobilization and the procedures for notification of registrants. Included is a look at the revitalization of the Selective Service System, various implications of the induction process, and a brief discussion of pre-induction classification.

Chapter III reviews the three aspects of accession qualification: aptitude (mental) screening, medical screening, and moral screening.

Chapter IV assesses the processing capabilities of the Military Entrance Processing Stations to include MEPS capacities for mobilization, service assignment and classification procedures, creation and uses of computer data bases for mobilization, and MEPS support capabilities.

Chapter V discusses the implication of inductee and accession travel on the national transportation system during full mobilization to include the implications of Army One-Station-Unit-Training (OSUT) versus Basic Training and cross-MEPS shipments to adjust workload.

Chapter VI briefly comments on Reception Station processing and implications of the training base capabilities. This area would have been more extensive had Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD not been postponed until mid-May 1982; it is an area for additional study.

Chapter VII looks at mobilization policy and guidance, the need for peacetime coordination, and the implications of processing/training capabilities on force structure requirements and national policy options.

Chapter VIII is the final chapter containing findings, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER II

INDUCTION DETERMINATION AND NOTIFICATION

Determination of Requirements

For this study, the determination of requirements is of two types. First, the training base requirements to fulfill projected force structure demands plus individual replacement needs less the anticipated supply of trained manpower. The input needs of the training base must be greater than the output requirement to offset attrition losses in the course of training. Second, the Selective Service requirement to issue sufficient induction notices to insure that the number of registrants who eventually qualify for military service and become inductees satisfies the stated training base input need. The number of inductees can be reduced by a comparable offset of volunteers.

Total Service and Army Needs. Determination of wartime manpower requirements has followed a scenario of an imminent NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict in which there is a declaration of national emergency and the implementation of full mobilization. Such a scenario generates the force structure requirements to insure success in such a conflict by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conjunction with the military departments. Policy and procedures to be followed in the wartime manpower program are contained in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1100.19, dated September 8, 1980.

Total Service Needs. Basically the DODI prescribes Manpower Determination Requirements, demand and supply, under the assumptions of full and partial mobilization and a limited call-up authority not involving mobilization. It includes the activation of all Reserve Components, the shifting of emphasis in the training base to essential combat skills in an expanded training week, the recall of retirees and the use of retirees to free active forces from CONUS support missions, and establishes criteria for leaves, passes and the return of casualties to duty. In addition, it specifies that requirements and demands for manpower should be consistent with the availability of equipment on hand or programmed, the nonreplaceable losses of equipment, and deployments must be consistent with programmed lift capability and equipment pre-positioning.

The author did not have the time nor the inclination within the scope of the study to pursue whether the current and projected force structure can be supported by equipment or lift within the programmed employment of the forces. However, the implications of requirements exceeding capabilities is commented on in Chapter VII. I am reminded of one of the findings of MOBEX 80 which was programming more tank crewmen for training than there would be equipment for them to operate considering the number of tanks on-hand, combat losses, and productivity of the industrial base (especially without total mobilization). This study dealt with the implications of full mobilization rather than a condition of total mobilization of the nation's resources in support of a national emergency, such as occurred during World War II.

The input requirement of untrained civilian manpower for the training base of each service is a number derived from the force structure and nonstructure requirements/demands less the trained supply

which is anticipated to be available. The supply of trained manpower consists of the active forces, Reserve Component units, the Individual Ready Reserve and the Standby Reserve. The availability of other than active forces is expressed in terms of a "show rate." To the extent that a show rate is too optimistic, then there could be a trained supply shortfall which will impact both the induction requirements as well as the time required to field a trained force structure. The following examples highlight potential problem areas for consideration.

For instance, OSD anticipates a seventy percent show rate from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD experience (Chapter IV) as well as actions by Reserve Component Commanders to reassign those who miss scheduled drills to the IRR causes me to believe a 70 percent show rate will not be attained.

In presentations to the USAWC Mobilization Advanced Course in the Spring of 1982, a number of guest speakers from Army Reserve Components have highlighted the differences between the assigned and deployable strengths of their units. Their contention being that they possess neither the trained manpower nor the equipment to insure that they are the viable force that many might think should mobilization occur tomorrow. Many new reserve component enlistees have chosen the split training option, whereby they complete basic training one year (summer) and then attend advanced individual training the following year. Thus, the assignment posture of the unit looks good on paper, but its capability to perform its wartime mission is decremented. The split option trained shortfall was posed to both TRADOC and HQDA representatives in interviews. TRADOC recognized the problem and its further implications. HQDA personnel contended that the problem was not of the magnitude I had

implied.

Another facet of Reserve Component reliability is the anticipated show rate of unit personnel. I do not question the good intentions of Reserve Component members during peacetime. However, during mobilization many reservists occupy key positions in industry and government which may hinder the response capability of particular units. A USAWC guest speaker cited as an example a reserve military police unit being composed of most of the homicide division of the Chicago Police Department. OSD has initiated a procedure of advising key elements in society of reservists in their organization. If the individual is to be exempt from unit deployment due to their criticality, then they will be transferred to the Standby Reserve. The review process will take 3-4 years to complete. So far, members of Congress and their staff as well as federal agencies are being solicited. State government and defense industries will be contacted next.

Army Needs. OSD has challenged the Army concerning the capability during mobilization to train new accessions, whether they be inductees or volunteers (applicants). Mobilization workload had been developed based upon requirements rather than capabilities. From the data recently received from OSD and the Army, the mobilization planning workload has been reduced to reflect more closely the capability of the training base to accept and train new accessions. Following is a comparison of the mobilization training workload -- requirements and capabilities.

MOBILIZATION WORKLOAD - REQUIREMENTS¹

<u>Time</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
M+30	133,191	17,750	9,000	11,930	171,871
M+60	133,894	19,750	9,000	12,740	175,384
M+90	65,648	23,360	9,000	12,740	110,748
M+120	132,191	23,360	7,600	12,740	175,891
M+150	131,944	29,200	7,600	12,740	181,484
M+180	<u>49,005</u>	<u>23,360</u>	<u>7,600</u>	<u>12,740</u>	<u>92,705</u>
TOTAL	645,843	136,780	49,800	75,630	908,053

MOBILIZATION WORKLOAD

TRAINING BASE CAPABILITIES²

<u>Time</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
M+30	88,900	17,750	10,900	11,930	135,480
M+60	56,601	19,750	10,100	12,740	99,191
M+90	46,678	23,360	9,200	12,740	91,978
M+120	72,275	23,360	8,900	12,740	117,275
M+150	56,601	29,200	7,000	12,740	105,541
M+180	<u>46,678</u>	<u>23,360</u>	<u>6,400</u>	<u>12,740</u>	<u>89,178</u>
Total	367,733	136,780	58,500	75,630	638,643

Comments concerning the reaction of a TRADOC representative will be covered in Chapter VII. For now, suffice it to say there is a question whether even the reduced capacity numbers could be realized if mobilization was to occur today.

The mobilization workload numbers are not only critical for the

respective service training base but also serve as the basis for Selective Service to issue the induction call and for MEPOOM to anticipate the registrant and applicant workload necessary to achieve the training input objective.

Selective Service Requirements. The training base requirements (assuming capacity is supportive thereof) of each service dictate the requirement for Selective Service to issue induction notices to registrants. The only remaining factor which impacts on the induction call is the anticipated or actual level of volunteers (applicants) for military service, whether an applicant through a service recruiter or volunteering for the draft. From M-day to M+13 the needs of the services will be filled exclusively from applicants and from the call-up of delayed entry program (DEP) personnel who are not currently attending school or have similar postponement criteria. From M+13 to M+30 the requirement will be filled exclusively by inductees. From M+30 onward the requirement will be filled by a combination of applicants and inductees. Applicants will be scheduled sixteen days in advance of their examination date in order to provide Selective Service with an estimate for the daily induction call. Approximately thirteen days is required to generate subsequent mailings of induction notices and provide the registrant with ten days to take care of personal business prior to reporting to the MEPS for an examination.

Several studies were contracted to determine the number of registrants who must be notified to insure that the training base requirements can be fulfilled. Previous studies by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1968 and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1978 had indicated that a 6:1 and 7:1 ratio, respectively, would be needed to guarantee the immediate availability of sufficient qualified regis-

trants. Both studies were based essentially on Selective Service statistics from the peacetime draft periods.

HumRRO Study, 1979. In 1979, the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) conducted a study for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L) to determine what level of induction call the Selective Service System would have to issue to insure that the service requirements of 100,000 inductees by M+60 and 650,000 inductees by M+180 could be assured and what would be the resultant impact on any single year group of males.

In their analysis, HumRRO found fault with a number of the criteria utilized in the previous studies. Their conclusion was that the ratio only needed to be 3.5:1 (issue induction notices to 3.5 more registrants than the number of inductees required) to meet immediate requirements and that over a long period of time the ratio would be closer to 2:1. Therefore, the service requirements could be satisfied for a short war scenario by a single year group, but that consideration ought to be given to involving more than one year group to spread the burden more equitably.³ It should be noted that the study was initiated under the concept that registration would not occur except under emergency conditions and when authorized it would be a mass registration of two year groups simultaneously.

HumRRO points out that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), Public Law 90-40 (as amended), has changed a number of criteria since most of the historical data was recorded. A national lottery will be used as the basis of the call and it will be regulated on a national entry basis rather than through local controls, the basis for deferments and postponements are different, and the standards -- both aptitude

(mental) and physical (medical) -- will be lower. The one assumption which may be optimistic is the will of the males in the prime year group to support the national interest in a European scenario, rather than adopt the anti-draft syndrome so prevalent during the Vietnam era.

A minimum score of 10 on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which is the cutoff between Mental Category IV and V, will qualify an individual for military service during full mobilization. This is definitely a lower qualifying score than used in any peacetime draft period. The MSSA specifies "that the minimum physical standards of acceptability shall not be higher than those applied to persons inducted between the ages of 18 and 26 in January 1945,"⁴ in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress. Therefore, under full mobilization the standards imposed by the MSSA should be applicable and the medical standards could be lower than periods used in past studies. The result should be a disqualification rate which is less than the previous studies.

Following is a comparison between the HumRRO Study estimates and those of Selective Service and others based upon 1972 experience.

DISPOSITION, IN PERCENTAGE, OF REGISTRANTS AVAILABLE⁵

<u>Disposition Items</u>	<u>HumRRO</u>	<u>SSS</u>
Available for Induction	100.0	100.0
Less: Postponements	34.3	38.6
Deferments	7.7	10.4
Classified as Obvious 4F	1.4	1.4
Fail to Report for Examination	5.9	11.8
Sub-Total Available to Report	50.7	37.8
Disqualified upon Examination	22.0	20.2

Sub-Total Available for Induction	28.7	19.0
Qualification Ratios	3.48:1	5.26:1
Qualified as Scheduled		15.65
Qualified from Availability Undetermined		3.35
Ratio Qualified as Scheduled		6.39:1

Postponements consist primarily of college students and the lower number used by HumRRO supposedly reflects a lower college population 1980-1985 than existed in 1978. Lower deferments reflect a lower rate of conscientious objectors and the exclusion of certain categories by the MSSA amended. The lower fail to report number reflects the will of the male prime year group to support the national interest.

Linton and Company, Inc. Although the study issued by Linton in January 1980 dealt primarily with the mobilization capacity of the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations, they did comment on the induction yield expected by Selective Service. Linton disagreed with the Selective Service yield of six induction notices mailed to attain one qualified inductee in favor of the "more realistic" 3.5:1 ratio determined by Gus Lee of HumRRO. Linton cited an Industrial College of the Armed Forces study from 1947 of Selective Service in World War II as part of the rationale for their position, even though they admit that the data is not exactly comparable. Linton anticipates the mobilization medical rejection rate to be 25 percent and the mental rejection rate to be 10 percent. This compares to the 1979 peacetime rejection rates of 51 percent mental and 37 percent medical.⁶ Selective Service rates have generally used 1966 draft criteria. Thus, Linton predicts that a higher percentage will be qualified for military service than Selective Service has predicted.

Science Applications, Inc. Study. Selective Service contracted Science Applications, Inc. to conduct a study of the interface between SS and the MEPS in controlling the flow of inductees. In the computation of workload the contractor did not do an independent analysis of the registrant population and how it could be expected to respond to a mobilization induction call. Selective Service provided the following percentages to the contractor: postponements - 37, deferments - 12, failure to report - 10, available to report - 39, disqualified upon examination - 19.5, and qualified and available for induction - 19.5 percent. The resulting qualification ratio is 5.13:1. The contractor was not aware of the HumRRO study and would not have considered it had they been.⁷

Selective Service was contacted on 26 April 1982 and stated that they preferred to utilize historical information as the basis of determining the size of the induction call. They did not support the HumRRO study on the contention that the study purpose was to determine a lower ratio. They cited the fact that even when there was a classification procedure to prescreen registrants the failure rate during the final aptitude and medical screening was approximately 50 percent. Therefore, they saw no reason to think that it would be any different during mobilization. The one factor that may not have fully been considered by Selective Service is that aptitude standards have been higher in peacetime than was the World War II criteria which is expected to be implemented during a national emergency and full mobilization.

It is the author's opinion that a more realistic ratio might be expected but that it probably would not be more favorable than 4.5:1 rather than the 3.5:1 ratio which was predicted by the HumRRO study.

However, I do not have any statistical data to support this conjecture.

Selective Service System Revitalization

During World War II and during the post war period up to 1970, Selective Service operated in a manner of decentralized execution whereby the local draft boards exercised considerable control and generally the oldest qualified person was drafted first. The anti-draft and anti-war movements associated with Vietnam protested the inequities and lack of uniformity with the system. In the early 1970's, Selective Service was reformed by legislative and administrative action which established a birthday lottery as the basis of call and reduced the number of judgemental classifications. The volunteer force came into being in 1973, when the Presidential authority to draft men for military service expired. Registration continued until terminated by Presidential Proclamation on March 29, 1975. Selective Service was placed in a "deep standby" position and most of its offices at the state and local level closed. By late 1976 it had reached its low point with a staff of approximately 100 personnel -- a level where it was to remain until late 1979.

"The impetus for revitalization began in 1977, when DoD levied new, more demanding manpower requirements upon Selective Service."⁸ The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the US General Accounting Office (GAO) subsequently concluded that Selective Service was ill-prepared to fulfill DoD mobilization requirements. This status was also confirmed by the 1978 "Nifty Nugget" mobilization exercise. Revitalization began in earnest in late 1979 with the development of a registration contingency plan and an effort to develop an ADP capability. In addition, plans were developed to reconstitute the field structure under cen-

tralized control, create an administrative law system which meets current standards of due process, select and train local board members, develop the management and ADP systems to control the claims/adjudication systems, and finally to develop an Alternative Service Program to complement the induction program.⁹

Registration. When President Carter announced his decision to resume registration for a draft in his State of the Union message on 20 January 1980, it seemed to be as big of a surprise to the Selective Service personnel as it was to the remainder of the nation. Registration as announced by the President included all personnel who were born in 1960 and 1961 and each subsequent year group would register in the month in which they reached their eighteenth birthday. Congress in subsequent action restricted registration to males, which was challenged in the courts. A court decision reaffirmed the right of the Congress to raise an Army and in so doing determine the composition of the force.

The success of the registration process has been challenged by the anti-registration and anti-war movement, who contend that they have strong support among the nation's youth. The initial registration data supplied by SSS seems to refute the claims of the anti-war movement. This information, verified by the GAO in a report issued December 19, 1980, contends that registration is equally if not more successful than it was when compulsory military service and the draft was in-being.

President Reagan campaigned on a platform of discontinuing registration. Several of his close advisors contended that registration or a return to the draft was not necessary as should the country find itself in the need for manpower to support its national interest that more would volunteer than the services could utilize. After the 1980 elections, the nation and some of the youth seemed to take a wait and see

attitude and registration numbers seemed to fall off for the age groups which had not initially registered. A GAO report issued early in 1982 contended that registration of the 1962 and 1963 year groups had fallen behind the draft period in spite of various publicity campaigns of SSS. The 1962 year group registered in one week in January 1981. The 1963 year group was the first to register continuously upon reaching age 18. However, this report covered a period prior to President Reagan's determination to continue registration.

However, Reagan chose on January 7, 1982 to continue the registration program and also chose to implement procedures to seek judicial action against those who had not registered in compliance with the laws. He did provide a grace period, which terminated 28 February 1982, so that individuals who had not previously registered could do so without penalty of the law. The following table displays the registration results by year group and the percentages of initial registration, as of end 1981, and as of 31 March 1982. By comparison, the rate of registration prior to the Vietnam Conflict was 90 percent by the end of the initial registration year and was 99 percent following the subsequent two years.

REGISTRATION OF MALES (SS ACT OF 1980)¹⁰

YEAR GROUP	PERCENTAGE OF ELIGIBLE MALES REGISTERED		
	<u>Initial</u>	<u>End 1981</u>	<u>31 March 1982</u>
1960	84	94	93.2*
1961	84	95	96.7
1962	77	88	93.2

1963	62	71	91.5
1964	-	-	101 **

* Decrease reflects the purification of the data base of eligible males.

** Based upon SSS estimates of the number of males born in the first three months of 1964. This year group is just registering in 1982.

Non-registrant enforcement has been questioned. Public Law 97-86 signed by the President on 1 December 1981 authorizes the President access to the Social Security Administration files for enforcement purposes and also required SSS to furnish, upon request, the names and addresses of registrants to the Defense Department and Treasury for recruiting purposes. On 26 March 1982, SSS received Administration authorization to proceed with a computer match compliance program. On the same day the US Court of Appeals remanded the District Court of the District of Columbia to reconsider their ruling in Wolman v. United States restricting the SSS from requiring registrants to furnish their Social Security Account Numbers in light of PL 97-86. Selective Service plans on providing lists of non-registrants to the Department of Justice for appropriate enforcement action.¹¹

Local Boards. One of the major changes which has occurred within the Selective Service System is the function of the local boards. Under the era of General Hershey, the local board was essentially autonomous and made policy for the community it served. Its functions included scheduling of persons for induction, classification, granting deferments as well as adjudicating claims. Under the Selective Service reforms the local board will decide a claim through its citizen volunteers who sit on the board. The local board is no longer under the control of the

State Director of Selective Service.

Selection of the 10,560 citizens who in an emergency would become the local board members who would adjudicate claims has been completed. Many thousands of responses were received to volunteer. Records were screened and interviews conducted of those qualified. Lists of board members were submitted to the Governors for formal nomination to the President for appointment. This will be the first time in the history of the agency that local board members will be formally trained in Selective Service policies and procedures as well as the major duties and responsibilities of local board members. Training began in April 1982 and will continue through September.

During peacetime the local board system is in a standby status. For that reason, citizens were selected who could service a minimum of five years.

Department of Defense Support. There has always existed a close working relationship between the Selective Service and the Department of Defense primarily in the qualification and induction of qualified registrants. However, the revitalization process expanded the support relationships primarily due to the meager staffing of the Agency and the inability to justify a large expenditure of funds for extensive equipment and/or facilities to support a contingency registration system.

Thus, in compliance with guidance contained in a 28 November 1979 memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Claytor, planning commenced to establish a joint computer center in the Chicago area to be operated by the Military Enlistment Processing Command, which could serve both the contingency planning of Selective Service as well as the daily needs of MEPCOM. Even the twelfth hour insertion of funding in

the FY 1981 DOD budget did not foresee the need for a system to support an active registration program, which was announced less than a month later. The lead-time to acquire a facility, peripheral equipment, recruit a systems software and control staff, and develop a software program required Selective Service to seek interim support from other federal agencies. However, the SSS-MEPOCOM Joint Computer Center became operational in August 1981 at Great Lakes, Illinois and within a month all files had been transferred to the new system and daily processing cycles were a routine occurrence. Selective Service has collocated a Data Management Center to the computer site and MEPOCOM Headquarters will relocate from Fort Sheridan to the Great Lakes site in the fall of 1982.

Department of Defense has agreed to make 436 Armed Forces Recruiting Offices available on M-Day to Selective Service to serve as Area Offices and will provide an interim staffing of approximately 1,500 personnel from the assets of the services recruiting force commencing on M-Day. The staffing has been identified and trained this past year. The recruiter support is currently specified for a period of approximately 45 days. Selective Service now estimates that it will need these personnel for at least 90 days and is expected to seek a change to the February 8, 1980 Memorandum of Understanding.

In addition, there is a Memorandum of Understanding between Selective Service and MEPOCOM regarding combined examination/induction processing during mobilization. Selective Service will place Liaison Officers in the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) upon mobilization. "Selective Service will control the flow of registrants to the MEPS in accordance with the manpower requirements established by DoD and the

operating schedules and capacities of the MEPS as furnished by MEPOCOM.¹³

The cooperation which is exhibited between the two operating agencies -- Selective Service and MEPOCOM -- has generally been superb. The stumbling blocks in the activation of the JCC were bureaucratic in nature and something which must be contended with in government operations. MEPOCOM is a jointly staff Department of Defense activity with Department of the Army acting as the executive agent. Procrastination in staffing decisions and funding support resistance are other examples of the bureaucracy encountered. However, even within OSD there can be conflicts of interest when more than one function is involved in an operation; i.e., accession policy and automation.

Induction Procedures

Legal Implications. The Selective Service is extremely sensitive to the legal implications of their procedures and policies. The Vietnam era resulted in needed legislative and administrative reforms in the system. And it serves as a reminder of the need to insure that the system is operated in an equitable manner. The anti-draft movement is still alive in the nation, although greatly reduced from the 1970's. When registration was announced the teach-ins resumed to educate resisters on avoiding registration, court injunctions have been sought to stop registration since the Congress determined that only men were to be registered and to preclude the requirement for social security numbers. Thus, there will always be some group which will attempt to stifle the initiatives which must be taken to insure the security of the nation. The induction system must insure that the intent of the law is followed so that we can respond when a true emergency exists. Legal implications

underlie the conduct of the lottery, the processing of postponements, adjudication of deferments and conscientious objector status, and the sequencing of the induction call. All of these will be discussed later in this chapter.

Lottery. The lottery was initiated in 1969 by authorization of Congress as a means of correcting perceived abuses in the System and to enhance the uniform application of the MSSA. Inductees were selected on the basis of date of birth by a national lottery. The lottery call was superimposed upon the local board quota system which resulted in various parts of the country issuing induction notices through different sequence numbers. Thus, not everyone with the same birthdate was called. Congress in 1971 authorized a uniform national call which requires Selective Service to maintain a single national registration list and to issue the induction notices in a random sequential listing by date of birth as determined by lottery.

Registration has permitted the development of registration files for all or parts of five year groups. Therefore, in the event of mobilization the Selective Service will conduct the national lottery on M-Day and establish the "order-of-call" based on Random Sequence Numbers. On M+1, following the authorization by Congress to induct personnel into the Armed Forces, the Director of Selective Service will order the issuance of induction notices following the order-of-call sequence.

The mechanism to conduct the lottery is in place at Selective Service National Headquarters and the procedures have been tested.

Postponements/Deferments. The reforms to the MSSA included a significant change in the number and types of deferments allowed. While

many of use who were exposed to the former registration system considered the classification system for attendance at college as a deferment, the new connotation is that of a postponement since it is for a much shorter duration. Educational postponements today consist of: graduation from high school or reaching age 20, whichever occurs first; college postponements until the completion of the current semester unless the person is a senior and then it extends until the end of the senior year. Education comprises the largest percentage of the anticipated postponements. A 1970 Executive Order abolished deferments based upon certain occupational employment, marriage, and paternity. Postponements are no longer a matter for the local boards but are considered administrative type actions to be performed at Selective Service regional offices.

The remaining deferments and exemptions which the local board members will adjudicate are: conscientious objectors, hardship, ministers/ministerial students, only son, alien or dual-national, Reservists and Veterans.

Hardship cases will be those whose induction would result in extreme hardship to dependents who have no other means of support and military compensation would be insufficient. It would also cover instances of previous separation from military service for dependency or hardship, if the hardship still exists.

Ministers of religion, as a regular and customary vocation, who preach and teach the principles of religion of a church or religious sect may be exempt from military service but not from registering. Likewise, students enrolled in a recognized theological or divinity school may be deferred.

Only son. An only son is not automatically deferred. A person may

be exempt from service if his father, brother or sister died as a result of military service, but the exemption does not apply in wartime.

A person could be exempt from military service depending on his country of citizenship. However, failure to serve could affect future eligibility for citizenship.

Reservists are eligible for a separate classification status, since it is assumed that they will perform service as a member of the Reserve Component upon mobilization.

Veterans of the armed forces are eligible for a separate classification. Their service requirements will depend upon the terms of the active duty commitment and length of service on both active duty and as a member of the Reserves.

Conscientious Objectors. An important part of the nation's draft laws are the provisions for conscientious objectors. When registration was reinstated many were encouraged to register under protest or to claim an objection to war. There is no provision during the registration process to claim conscientious objector status; that is a part of the classification process and is adjudicated by the local board. The Supreme Court ruled in 1971 that a person cannot object to a particular war or conflict on a selective basis. To qualify as a conscientious objector, an individual must object to participation in war in any form based on either religious, moral or ethical grounds. The fundamental issues are the sincerity of his beliefs, depth of his conviction, and that his conscience would not let him be at peace with himself should he participate in war.

Being a conscientious objector does not relieve the person of the obligation to serve his nation. Depending upon his beliefs, he may

chose to serve in the military service in a position which does not require training or use of arms or he must perform a period of civilian service contributing to national health, safety or interest. The former is classified 1-A-O and the latter is classified as 1-O. The requirement for service in either case is dependent upon the same qualification criteria as those inducted. The individual must be determined to be qualified on the basis of mental and physical examinations. Failure of either aspect would exempt the individual from military or civilian service.

While the individual's case is being adjudicated, the individual is deferred from examination. Following the adjudication the individual is ordered to the MEPS for the qualification tests; for induction in the case of those individuals who were not given conscientious objector status as well as those electing to be classified as 1-A-O; and for alternative service for those classified as 1-O.

The conscientious objector poses two problems for the military: first, the processing time in the MEPS to determine his qualification for service which is more of a scheduling problem to insure that the normal inductee requirements can be satisfied while not prolonging the examination so as to jeopardize the induction call sequencing. Second, the impact on the training base for those electing 1-A-O status who will go into basic training and perform all the normal functions with the exception of training on the use and firing of weapons. As we have noted earlier in this chapter, the estimate of the number of conscientious objectors which can be anticipated will vary considerably thus complicating planning.

Conscientious Objectors - Alternate Service. The Director of Selective Service has been charged with developing an alternative ser-

vice program as an integral part of the MSSA. Failure to provide alternative service to those conscientious objectors declining military service could impinge on the veracity of the entire Selective Service procedures. To accomplish this mission, an Alternative Service staff was formed to develop contingency plans. An initial concept plan was prepared and published in the Federal Register on January 22, 1981 and the comment period ended on March 31, 1981 with 64 responses from 57 different organizations/individuals.¹⁴ In June 1981 a revised Alternate Service Concept Paper was released which has been used to create a standby operational plan.

The program consists of three primary components: jobs, priorities and people. The jobs must be civilian in character and contribute to national health, safety or interest to satisfy legislative criteria. Jobs will be sought through the sponsorship of public agencies, private and religious organizations, local and state governments and finally the federal government. Pay would be established at the minimum wage levels provided it does not exceed the pay of a person entering military service. This program is in lieu of military service and shortages are expected in the civilian workforce as large numbers of young people join the military service. The program will seek to match individuals' abilities and interests to the approved job openings.

Selective Service has been actively seeking organizations willing to place CO's. The federal government must be prepared to fund this program and create the jobs if there is insufficient response from other sectors. If mobilization were to occur today, it's highly probable that the federal government will have to absorb the slack in jobs for CO's to insure that a viable alternate service program is available and

that this important provision of the MSSA is being complied with.

Notification Procedures. Following the conduct of the national lottery, mailgrams will be sent to all registrants whose birthdates correspond to the order of the call which was determined by the lottery. It is estimated that all mailgrams for the initial call will be distributed on M+3. Registrants will have ten days to take care of personal business, file requests for postponements and deferments for consideration of conscientious objector status and other considerations. The first registrants are scheduled to report on M+13 to the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) specified in the induction notice for aptitude testing and a medical examination to determine the registrant's qualification for military service. The ten day period to handle personal business is driven strictly by the requirement to have the first inductee at the MEPS by M+13. Granting of post-induction leave is a service decision. The current policy is not to grant it. However, if the mobilization response exceeds the training capacity post-induction leave may have to be granted. The services gain the flexibility of a DEP of up to 90 days for service applicants. Sometime after M+2 or M+3 months, Selective Service would like to provide registrants with more notice and institute pre-induction pre-classification and examination for those who are draft eligible based upon future projection of requirements.¹⁵ The ability to initiate this procedure would be dependent upon monthly manpower requirements and MEPS capacities.

Selective Service plans on issuing approximately 35,000 notices per day for the period M+13 through M+30. Based upon ratios accepted by Selective Service, it is estimated that approximately 14,000 registrants will appear daily at the MEPS for processing and of that number a

minimum of 6,500 registrants should be qualified for induction, inducted the same day, and shipped to the appropriate service reception center for in-processing and assignment to a training company. In 17 processing days, the inductee input would be approximately 110,500 through M+30 against a total M+30 service requirement of approximately 135,500. It is estimated that the processing of applicants and those persons who can be shipped early out of the DEP between M-Day and M+13 will be approximately 30,000.

After M+30, the number of registrants reporting for induction processing will reflect an integration of applicants. Applicants will be scheduled into the MEPS 16 days in advance. Since no applicants will be processed during the period M+13-M+30, those applying during that period will be scheduled into the MEPS commencing on M+31. Inductees will make up the difference between the daily requirement and the applicants scheduled into the MEPS. There also will be another category of personnel being processed -- personnel previously qualified and placed in the delayed entry program (DEP) due to a specific training requirement or as a result of service applicants, which at the time qualified, exceeded the training capacity of the particular service and was scheduled for a delayed entry to coincide with the next available training opening. Those personnel receive abbreviated processing in the form of a medical inspection to determine if there has been any significant change in their medical condition which might disqualify him for military service. Following successful medical inspection the applicant will be shipped to the service reception center.

To the extent that the daily response to the induction notices varies, it will be difficult to make adjustments on a real-time basis.

The fact that induction notices are sent by mailgram and the registrant must be provided a minimum time to arrange personal affairs (10 days), adjusting the call is an after-the-fact action. Thus, it cannot be anticipated that the number of personnel processed and the number induced will be the same each day. However, over a period of time (several weeks) it is hoped that the average will be sufficient to satisfy service requirements.

Should mobilization occur during the summer months, then the registrant call ratio will be reduced since the number of educational postponements will be greatly reduced since only a small percent of the student population will be attending summer school.

Induction notices are mailed based strictly on the sequential birthdates determined by the lottery without regard to geographical distribution of the registrants of the particular birthdate. Following M+30, the applicant response by geographical area may not coincide with the induction call. The induction call must continue to follow the call sequence and thus the workload is expected to vary between MEPS. However, there are several actions the Selective Service can take to assist in processing and anticipating workload shifts. First, Selective Service and MEPCOM need to develop a program code to indicate when a registrant on the Selective Service delivery list has had some form of prior processing when the delivery list is compared by computer with the MEPCOM data base. Second, Selective Service can do a ZIP code match of the delivery list to given MEPS to determine how the potential distribution matches MEPS capacities. If there is sufficient experience on show rates by ZIP codes, then some consideration could be given to adjusting boundaries. Further action to accommodate the workload shift will be discussed in Chapter IV.

Volunteers for Induction. Individuals between 18 and 26 years of age can volunteer for induction. Those between 17 and 18 can volunteer with parental consent. Induction priority occurs in the prime year of eligibility -- the 20th year of birth at whatever time mobilization is declared. Induction volunteers are referred to the local board who notifies National Headquarters and the individual goes to the head of the queue.¹⁶

Recruiting During Mobilization. Recruiting during peacetime for the volunteer force is a necessity. However, during mobilization it becomes impossible to recruit the force required strictly from volunteers, especially the number of personnel that the Army requires. Prior to the downturn in the economy at the end of FY 1980, the competition between the services for the available manpower was intense and with the imposition of quality standards by the Congress the competition became even keener for the Army. Prior to the imposition of the Congressional limitations, the Army had relied on a disproportionately high percentage of Category IV personnel to come close to the annual quotas. Since then, the economy has permitted each of the services not only to satisfy their quotas but to improve the quality of the force to a level higher than the Congressional limitations.

During mobilization the requirements of all the services increase, but not in direct proportion to peacetime requirements. Navy and Air Force are proportionately less due to being dependent upon major end items (i.e., ships and aircraft) which are both expensive and require extensive lead time for the industrial base to produce. Thus, Marine Corps and Army requirements are considerably higher. During peacetime, the Air Force has been most successful in meeting its enlistment

requirements and with the highest level of upper aptitude category personnel. The Navy has generally been the second most successful. The Air Force currently has the longest waiting list to get personnel into training schools.

Under mobilization conditions the Army plans on terminating recruiting operations at M+13. Its recruiting force would then be utilized to augment the Selective Service, augment guidance counselors in the MEPS to perform the classification function, and to return trained non-commissioned officers to the training base or to round out active force units. Induction generally would provide the Army a cross-section of the inductee population and thus could fulfill the wartime quality requirements. The Marine Corps seems to be willing to forego recruiting on the same contention as the Army — that induction would give them a cross section of the inductee population. However, the Air Force seems adamant about continuing recruiting since they believe that they can maintain a much higher quality force than they would get from a slice of the inductee population. They seem to believe that given a choice of being drafted that enough people will volunteer for the Air Force rather than waiting to be drafted or volunteering for the draft. The Navy probably will fair better through recruiting than they would from an induction slice. Whatever volunteer shortfalls the Navy has would be overcome by inductees.

During the course of this study, I did not seek an official position from the US Air Force, US Navy and US Marine Corps. The contention stated above is based mainly on an interview with an official of ASD(MRA&L), discussions with members of the service recruiting forces, historical experience from past conflicts and personal knowledge of the last several years of supporting volunteer force recruiting.

From the implications on processing procedures, the fewer categories of personnel to be controlled into the MEPS the better. The flow control of inductees and volunteers for the draft would be further complicated by adding a third category of service applicants.

The Army and Marine Corps might object to the Air Force and Navy continuing recruiting on the contention that they would siphon the cream of the crop of the youth so that their service would not receive a proportionate share. It is not certain whether OSD would permit one or two services to continue recruiting unless some safeguards are instituted which would insure that the Army and Marine Corps receive a certain proportion of upper aptitude category personnel.

One consideration might be to preclude personnel subject to induction notices during the first three months of the call from volunteering for a particular service through a recruiter. If there is a high volunteer rate which exceeds the needs of a particular service, an individual can be placed in the delayed entry program (DEP) but not longer than the number of days remaining in the current month plus 60 days.

Return to Pre-Induction Classification

Although Proud Spirit 1980 indicated that Selective Service could satisfy the DOD mobilization requirements due to the implementation of registration, the Congress still questioned what type of classification process could enhance the mobilization system. Section 303 of the DOD Authorization Act of 1980 directed Selective Service to report on any new and improved procedures for registration and classification of persons under the Military Selective Service Act, placing special emphasis on administrative medical procedures that will result in more efficient and cost-effective screening of registrants.

Selective Service has determined that mobilization would be enhanced only to the extent that the pre-mobilization classifications were permanent. Very few classifications are permanent. Local board screening during past draft periods resulted in only approximately four percent of the registrant population not ordered for medical examination for obvious physically disabling reasons. Department of Health and Human Services data indicate that about 1.6 percent of the 19 year old male population are permanently disabled. Permanent classifications do not include hardship determinations or conscientious objectors. Hardships previously were valid for only one year. As previously stated, Selective Service contends that attitudes change and thus conscientious objector status should be adjudicated by a local board upon mobilization.¹⁷

Selective Service notified Congress in April 1981 that an administrative pre-screen for permanent disqualification would cost approximately \$1.4 million per year.¹⁸ At the request of Selective Service, the author developed an estimate of the cost of examining 1.5 million male registrants at the MEPS on a pre-mobilization basis. Male examination and support costs in FY82 constant dollars was \$143.21 per registrant or approximately \$215 million annually. A cost estimate of \$153.89 per female or approximately \$231 million annually if classification was extended to 1.5 million females.¹⁹

The final responsibility rests with the Congress. But, premobilization classification is a very costly matter even for just an administrative screen for permanent disqualification. Full classification would save very little time at mobilization and would be of little value due to the time lapse between examination and mobilization. The exam-

ination would have to occur on an even basis throughout the year and the mobilization call occurs based upon a random birthdate lottery.

CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

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2. US Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Revision of Joint Augmentation Unit (JAU) TDA, Letter to Military Enlistment Processing Command, 3 December 1981.
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5. Ibid., Table 1 (author interpreted) and Table 4.
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7. Interview (telephone) with Bruce William Bennett, Science Applications, Inc., 26 April 1982.
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13. Memorandum of Understanding between the Selective Service System and the Military Enlistment Processing Command, 21 August 1980.

14. Selective Service System, Semiannual Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1 April 1981 - 30 September 1981, p. 11.
15. Interview with Herbert C. Puscheck, 4 March 182.
16. Ibid.
17. Selective Service System, 1 October 1980 - 31 March 1981, p. 17.
18. Ibid.
19. U.S. Military Enlistment Processing Command, Examination and Support Costs of Classification at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES), Letter to Selective Service System, 1 June 1981.

CHAPTER III

INDUCTION QUALIFICATION PROCEDURES

The qualification of an individual -- registrant or applicant (volunteer) -- consists of three distinct parts: Aptitude or mental qualification, medical qualification, and moral qualification. The one which was most controversial several years ago, in that it questioned the "quality" of individuals enlisted into the Army, is aptitude qualification. Prior to 1980 when Secretary of the Army Alexander took exception to the terminology, it was known as mental qualification.

Aptitude Qualification

MEPOCOM administers the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) as the means of determining an individual's aptitude for military service and for specific duties within the military. A specific portion of the ASVAB comprises the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which determines eligibility for military service. In addition to the regular version administered to military service applicants, MEPOCOM administers the test in an institutional version to various high schools and technical schools as an aid in counseling and a means of gaining access to the school for service recruiters. Although the test can be administered to all students, it is primarily intended for juniors and seniors. The institutional test serves as a qualifier for military service and the score remains valid for two years.

Type of Test Needed for Qualification. During World War II, a minimum AFQT score of 10 was required to qualify for induction. This will be the minimum qualifying score for military service during mobilization. The current peacetime score for entry into the military varies by service. (The Army has used a range of 16-31 for high school graduates and 31-49 for non-high school graduates; today the minimum entry score is at the high end of each score range.)

The time required to administer the full ASVAB to include instructions is approximately 144 minutes. The time required to administer only the AFQT portion including instructions is 63 minutes. Scoring today is accomplished by optical scan equipment in 44 MEPS and manually at the remaining 23 MEPS and two substations. All test results are manually key stroked into the data base. With completion of the installation of Sperry-Univac System 80 minicomputers in each MEPS scheduled for the fall of 1982, all tests will be read by electronic scan equipment directly into the computer data base. This System will correct all of the test scoring mobilization processing shortcomings noted in previous exercises and contracted studies.

MEPCOM has proposed administering only the AFQT portion of the ASVAB during mobilization since it is the basic qualification tool. The remainder of the ASVAB is used to determine MOS producing training aptitude/requirements. Processing time then can be reduced in the MEPS thus increasing the processing capacity.

During World War II, the classification process was administered at the reception stations. Today, a large portion of classification will be performed in the MEPS. The Army and in particular TRADOC representatives seem insistent that the full ASVAB is required to assign the

individual to the proper training site. Since equipment is becoming more sophisticated, it is crucial to have a more detailed analysis of inductee aptitude capabilities. As long as the Army is determined to retain One-Station-Unit-Training (OSUT) during mobilization, it appears to be important to administer the full ASVAB. If a common basic training was to be administered to all inductees, as occurred during World War II, then maybe just the AFQT portion would be sufficient.

ASD(MRA&L) is likewise insistent about MEPOCOM continuing to administer the full ASVAB during full mobilization. The views of the other services are incorporated in the ASD (MRA&L) position.

Testing Locations. The ASVAB is currently administered by either MEPOCOM military personnel or Office of Personnel Management (OPM) testers. OPM testing is performed primarily at Mobile Examining Test (MET) sites — 902 geographically dispersed sites throughout the country. OPM is reimbursed on the basis of a test session fee adjusted annually. The ASVAB is also administered in the MEPS, at a frequency determined by local conditions. MET type testing is currently the primary means since very little one-day processing occurs in the MEPS during peacetime. Recruiters want to insure that the applicant fulfills the aptitude standards before transporting them to the MEPS for the medical examination.

During mobilization the emphasis will change to one-day processing of registrants if at all possible. The ASVAB will be administered either within the MEPS or at a local site under the control of the MEPS in most instances. MEPOCOM plans to utilize the MET sites for testing of applicants and has proposed to Selective Service the testing of conscientious objectors at MET sites to reduce travel costs as well as diminish the workload at the MEPS. Since the Army is the largest service supported

in peacetime and will discontinue recruiting at M+13, the number of MET sites used for applicants will be reduced. The use of MET sites in the vicinity of the MEPS has been considered if needed to absorb an overload at the MEPS.

To assist in maintaining a flow of personnel through the processing cycle, many MEPS have planned to administer a night test at the contract lodging facility to those applicants requiring tests and those registrants which report the night before.

Special Tests. Since MEPOOM was formed as a command in 1976, one of the largest increases in workload has been the administration of special tests for the recruiting services. Special tests are conducted within the MEPS and the impact is a function of the time required to administer the test, space required, and the applicant to proctor ratio which averages 2:1. MEPOOM examined the option of returning the administration of special tests to the respective services in FY 1980 during a study seeking additional manpower staffing. It was abandoned as "not a viable option" since many of the special tests are required for determination of advanced schooling and are an integral part of the enlistment contract.

Chapter 9, AR 601-270 which prescribes "Processing of Selective Service Registrants" does not address the administration of special tests. MEPOOM Mobilization Plan 1-82 calls for special tests to be phased out during the period M-Day to M+12.

Service reception stations/training centers will be prepared to administer special tests to determine special aptitudes for training which requires specialized skills.

Medical Qualification

Section IV, Chapter 9, AR 601-270 prescribes the medical procedures to be followed in the medical qualification of Selective Service Registrants. The specific medical standards to be applied are contained in AR 40-501 (Standards of Medical Fitness). During peacetime processing the provisions of Chapter 2 (Medical Fitness Standards for Appointment, Enlistment and Induction) apply. These standards are approximately the same standards employed during World War II and have been utilized ever since with slight modification based upon new innovations in medical science.¹

One question which is often asked is "why employ peacetime standards in mobilization when the manpower needs are greater?" AR 40-501 includes Medical Fitness Standards for Mobilization (Chapter 6), however they have never been utilized. During both the Korean War and Vietnam the standards as contained in Chapter 2 were utilized. At the current time, OSD has no intention of utilizing the Chapter 6 Mobilization Standards during full mobilization, but will retain current medical standards.² Special physical qualification standards for the various services will not be applied to registrants, or applicants under a DOD determination. Service Reception Stations will administer the special medical tests, (i.e., special color blindness, depth perception, and strength tests employed by either the Navy or Air Force).

The author does not profess any expertise in the medical field, but a comparison of Chapter 2 with Chapter 6, AR 40-501 indicates that the mobilization standards, if implemented, are not as stringent as those for peacetime enlistment. Without delving into technical aspects of fitness standards there are several obvious comparisons which can be made:³

<u>PHYSICAL FEATURE</u>	<u>MEDICAL FITNESS STANDARDS</u>	
	<u>Chapter 2 - Current</u>	<u>Chapter 6 - Mobilization</u>
Hearing	Uncorrected hearing, within the speech reception score, of 20dB or more in better ear.	Uncorrected hearing, within the speech reception score, of 30dB or more in better ear.
Amputation of arm or forearm.	Disqualifying	Disqualifying only if a suitable prosthesis is not available, or double amputee regardless.
Amputation of leg, thigh or foot.	Disqualifying	Disqualifying if suitable prosthesis is not fitted or if use of cane or crutches is required or double amputee.
Eyesight	Blindness in either eye.	Blindness, complete, both eyes.

Section IV, Chapter 9 (draft), AR 601-270 also prescribes medical procedures to be followed in registrant processing when they claim various ailments, those previously discharged for medical reasons, and "papers only" evaluation of registrants, such as those who appear to have obviously disqualifying conditions for military service.

MEPCOM requested and was given authority to terminate registrant processing upon discovery of an obviously disqualifying medical condition and to develop a joint MEPCOM/SSS prescreening system for those registrants with obviously disqualifying medical conditions. The latter is the procedure referenced in the preceding paragraph as a "papers only" evaluation.

MEPCOM also requested authority to waive a ten percent variance in height and weight standards during mobilization. Apparently the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps were in favor of the waiver, but the Army as Executive Agent said no and the issue was not forwarded to OSD for

resolution. (There may have been some difference of opinion among the Army staff on this issue!) The contractual study performed by Syllogistics, Inc. recommended that certain aspects of the medical examination be eliminated or transferred to the service reception stations. These procedures included: blood test for syphilis, audio screening, chest x-ray, and breast and pelvic examinations for females. Their contention was that the low disqualifying rate for each of these did not justify continued use, especially under mobilization conditions.⁴ This recommendation was rejected by each of the services on the contention that a full medical examination must be performed, since certain of these tests do provide a legal basis to exclude the government from subsequent disability payments, and the time required to perform the tests will not be a limiting factor.

Currently authority to classify an individual 4-F is vested in the Secretary of Defense following a determination that he is unacceptable for military service. MEPCOM has recommended that the Secretary of Defense grant that authority to the Director, Selective Service System for those individuals with obviously disqualifying conditions without a MEPCOM medical examination determination. Those conditions envisioned include: "amputees, the blind, those missing eye(s), paraplegics, those presently confined serving sentences for commission of a felony, documented mental incompetents, etc."⁵ To date, no response has been received to this recommendation.

As an aftermath of Exercise Grand Payload, MEPCOM plans to test in selected MEPS the feasibility of blood typing, since blood is already being drawn to test for syphilis. If adopted, the service reception stations would have all the information required to prepare identi-

fication tags and the Identification Card (less the photograph) prior to the arrival of the applicant or inductee.

Moral Qualification

A registrant whose record of convictions or adverse juvenile adjudications reflects frequent difficulties with law enforcement agencies, criminal tendencies, a history of antisocial behavior, alcoholism, drug abuse, sexual misconduct, or questionable moral character is unacceptable, since he is likely to be a disciplinary problem for the military service.⁶

Although the Department of Defense has professed this policy, the ascertaining of such information rests primarily with the registrant and once ascertained the procedures for determining the validity of such information under mobilization conditions is an involved process which is largely decentralized to the MEPS level.

Processing Moral Waivers and Verifying Offenses. The responsibility for ascertaining whether a registrant is an offender of the law will be determined during induction processing primarily from the registrant himself based upon his answers when completing DA Form 4711-R (Statement of Law Violations). If the registrant indicates in the affirmative that he has "been arrested, charged, cited, or held by Federal, State, or other law enforcement or juvenile authorities regardless of whether the citation or charge was dropped or dismissed or you were found not guilty,"⁷ or in the affirmative to five similar questions then he is subject to a moral eligibility determination. This requires the completion of DA Form 2981 (Application for Determination of Moral Eligibility for Induction) and if a law enforcement records check is necessary, completion of DD Form 369 (Police Records Check). Minor offenses are within the authority of the MEPS Commander to waive, others must be submitted to the Commander, MEPCOM. According to draft

paragraph 9-19h, AR 601-270, "the burden of proof for registrant's claims to bar induction, such as unverifiable criminal offenses, homosexuality, and drug abuse, rests with the registrant."

Currently, the MEPS moral waivers clerk will make numerous checks with various law enforcement and other agencies to verify data prior to completing the adjudication process for registrants. In those instances in which written substantiating information must be received the registrant will be processed to determine their overall qualification, and if otherwise qualified, placed in a Reevaluation Believed Justified (RBJ) status. MEPCOM estimates that an individual will be in a RBJ status for approximately 15-30 days.

Most metropolitan police departments, county police as well as state police are tied into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Verification of criminal records and a search of outstanding warrants is performed by a computer search of the records on file. The US Air Force gains access to this data through civilian police agencies during peacetime. With the installation of System 80 minicomputers in each MEPS, OSD should explore with the Justice Department the provision of this records search service to MEPCOM during mobilization. I do not make this proposal in an attempt to create additional work for MEPCOM but as a means of improving the data search portion of the verification process. The records search could be made for all registrants or just those who provide an affirmative answer on DA Form 4711-R. I do not propose processing this information through the Defense Investigative Service, since most of their interface with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is on a manual basis which would be too time consuming and is one reason

for the lengthy process currently experienced in completing National Agency Checks.

MEPOCOM, following a technical review of this paper on 25 May 1982, advised the author that their Automation Management Staff was being directed to incorporate a potential NCIC interface capability in the System 80 software package.

Syllogistics, Inc. in their January 1982 report to MEPOCOM recommended that "responsibility to verify or refute involvement with law enforcement authorities should be spelled out in detail."⁸ How extensive must a search for past offenses be and how much time is reasonable awaiting a law enforcement response? The telephone verification process is cumbersome, ineffective and inefficient as to make it useless; juvenile offense information may be difficult, if not impossible to obtain; and finally, guidance which was contained in MEPOCOM Mobilization Plan 1-81 (which will be superceded by 1-82, utilized for this study) to induct if that cannot be verified, needs clarification.⁹ I would agree with many of their comments. MEPOCOM has initiated action to resolve some of the items. My proposal to seek a NCIC interface would also help. I also question whether there is a conflict between the policy referenced at the beginning of this section and the procedures contained in Chapter 9, AR 601-270 -- the procedure might be more realistic than the policy during full mobilization.

Standardizing Offenses. To assist in the determination of qualifying and disqualifying offenses for military service, Chapter 9, AR 601-270 contains guidelines of typical offenses describing minor traffic offenses, minor nontraffic offenses, other (minor) misdemeanors, and felonies. To aid in mobilization processing, MEPOCOM has requested ASD

(MRA&L) obtain a national standard, irrespective of local laws, to be used for induction processing when offenses are encountered which involve apparent disparities in classification. Because of disparity in classification of offenses among the various state and local laws there could be geographical discrimination during induction processing.¹⁰ To date no answer has been received.

Fingerprinting and ENTNAC. During peacetime processing, all applicants otherwise qualified are fingerprinted and given an ENTNAC interview. Under mobilization, the ENTNAC interview is discontinued and fingerprinting is only performed for specific categories of personnel, such as those entering the health profession. Even those admitting previous offenses on DA Form 4711-R will not be fingerprinted. The Air Force has proponency for utilization of computerized fingerprint identification, but the legal implications as well as state-of-the-art preclude consideration at this time.

The official HQDA position is that an ENTNAC will not be performed at the MEPS during mobilization.

Security Clearance Implications. During peacetime the initial processing is completed for a National Agency Check for those individuals going into training which will require the individual to possess a security clearance. Under mobilization processing, this action will be deferred to the reception stations. If the individual is being placed in the limited DEP awaiting special schooling then this could impact on the timing of the clearance and the initiation of training. During peacetime the individual can be held in the DEP for a year while awaiting a training required security clearance.

The only aspect of the mobilization processing which has a security implication for registrants is in the event an individual refuses to

subscribe to the oath of allegiance or oath of service and obedience.

Then a DA Form 873 (Certificate of Clearance and/or Security Determination) will be prepared and annotated "as not eligible" due to failure to execute the oath.

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

1. Interview (telephone) with Einar Fimma, COL, MC, Office of Surgeon, US Military Enlistment Processing Command, 13 May 1982.
2. Ibid.
3. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 40-501, Chapters 2 and 6.
4. Syllogistics, Inc., Mobilization Plan Validations, pp. IV-10 to IV-12.
5. US Military Enlistment Processing Command, Mobilization Examination Procedures, Letter to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics - Military Policy and Force Management), 23 February 1982.
6. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 601-270, para. 9-15 (draft), (hereafter referred to as "AR 601-270").
7. US Department of the Army, DA Form 4711-R, question a.
8. Syllogistics, pp. IV, 1-2.
9. Ibid., pp. IV, 18-19.
10. US Military Enlistment Processing Command, Mobilization Issues, Letter to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics - Military Personnel and Force Management). 11 February 1982.

CHAPTER IV

MEPS PROCESSING CAPABILITIES

While the Selective Service System was in "deep-standby" in the mid- to late-1970's, it was criticized as the limiting factor in mobilizing the nation's manpower resources. Following Selective Service revitalization and the implementation of peacetime registration, most critics concluded that the capability to organize and issue an induction call had been achieved. Conjecture then turned to the processing of inductees into the Armed Forces -- a function of MEPCOM through the Military Entrance Processing Stations, formerly known as Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) -- and the capability of the training base to transform civilians into soldiers as limiting factors. The latter will be addressed in Chapter VI. For uniformity in this paper all references to the term AFEES has been changed to MEPS.

An assessment of the processing capabilities consists of several factors: first, the capacity of the MEPS to perform the functions of aptitude, moral and medical qualification; second, the classification procedures performed by the services within the MEPS; third, the data base interfaces between Selective Service, MEPCOM and MEPS, and the service reception stations; and finally, MEPS support capabilities.

MEPS Capacity

This subject was examined by the General Accounting Office in 1979

and 1980; by Linton and Company, Inc., a OSD contractor in 1980; additionally, a study contracted by Selective Service in 1981 was performed by Science Applications, Inc.; and several other studies were conducted for Selective Service and MEPOCOM by Syllogistics, Inc. These studies and an in-depth examination of MEPOCOM and MEPS mobilization plans as well as preliminary results from Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD conducted in the spring of 1982 serve as the basis for this section on MEPS capacities.

General Accounting Office Reports. In May 1979, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report to the Secretary of Defense concerning "Problems in Getting People Into the Active Force After Mobilization." This report dealt primarily with the capabilities of the MEPS and the expansion of the training base, especially within the Army since it is by far the largest recipient of inductees after mobilization.

GAO found fault with MEPOCOM for not distributing its mobilization plan, based upon pre-October 1977 requirements, to subordinate elements. It determined that the physical facilities were probably adequate to perform the required mobilization load but found a shortage of physicians to be the limiting factor. MEPOCOM had estimated a need for an additional 378 full-time physicians, whereas GAO estimated the requirement to be 193 full-time physicians by M+60, assuming that the first inductees do not arrive until M+30. GAO recommended that the medical examination follow administration of the mental and moral tests thereby reducing the need for physicians. At the time the report was prepared, MEPOCOM had sought increased physician manning from either active or reserve forces. GAO found this unacceptable due to the shortage which already existed in those components. They recommended that

most of the fee-basis physicians employed in peacetime be employed on a full-time basis during mobilization since most of them do not have reserve component obligations.¹ Current medical assets include one General Schedule physician per MEPS with the exception of Birmingham which is authorized two. Additional assets include fee-basis physicians hired for a set fee per day from the local marketplace based upon projected daily workload. GAO may have overlooked the fact that many of the peacetime fee-basis physicians have a normal practice and usually work only one or two days a week in the MEPS, unless they are retired from full-time medical practice.

In July 1980, GAO updated their previous data in a report "Actions to Improve Parts of the Military Manpower Mobilization System are Underway." This report was complimentary of the actions which had been taken since the previous report, but continued to challenge the training base capabilities, acknowledged the capability of Selective Service to provide inductees to the MEPS by M+13 but found fault with a non-operative local and appeal board organization, and continued to fault MEPCOM for not being more aggressive in revising mobilization plans/procedures; the GAO Report also took exception to the OSD decision to provide the needed physicians to the MEPS from retirees of all services.² OSD had directed the establishment of Joint Augmentation Units (JAUs) for each MEPS to provide the mobilization staffing for two shifts per day, six days per week operations with a greatly expanded workload.

Linton and Company, Inc. Study. In January 1980, Linton and Company, Inc. of Washington, DC (hereafter referred to as Linton) issued the results of a study on "Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station Mobilization Capacity" prepared for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Management). The background for the study contained

planning guidance for Selective Service to deliver the first inductees to the MEPS by M+30. Although the study recognized that on-going efforts were underway to improve the processing capabilities, it addressed the situation as it existed at that time. The study summarized the MEPS mobilization capacity based upon existing plans as:

MEPS DAILY CAPACITY³

<u>Facilities</u>	<u>Mental Exams</u>	<u>Male Physical Exams</u>
19,000	39,000	11,680

assuming a six-day week/two shifts per day mode of operation. The limiting factor according to Linton was medical processing and more specifically the requirement for physicians. The MEPS standard had been one physician per 40 applicants requiring physicals. Thereafter, one physician per every additional 40 applicants.

Other problems determined by Linton included inadequate ADP capabilities, reliance on manual personnel operations, manpower resource availability during mobilization, Army plans to MOS classify in the MEPS and the potential bottleneck (addressed later in this chapter), and flow control of registrants between the receipt of Notice of Induction through the MEPS to the Training Centers, to include who is going to control the flow.

Linton also disagreed with the Selective Service induction yield, as was discussed in Chapter II. They felt more registrants will appear at the MEPS for processing than Selective Service predicts.

Science Applications, Inc. Science Applications, Inc. (hereafter referred to as SAI) was contracted by Selective Service to develop a mobilization planning and control procedure and model for their use. As

a part of the study effort, Bruce William Bennett and Charles Robert Roll, Jr. of SAI examined the capacities of the MEPS and concluded that without some expansion of capabilities it was quite likely some MEPS at some point in time could be overloaded by a combination of volunteers and induction candidates. Further, Selective Service must consider MEPS capacities rather than strictly national training shipment requirements when issuing their induction calls. SAI stated "it will be important to size the national processing capacity such that, no matter what mix of volunteers and induction candidates is processed, training shipments can always be met with confidence."⁴

In their data analysis as a prelude to development of the planning and control computer models, SAI addressed three policy questions:⁵

- Do the MEPS have adequate capacity to process the induction candidates who will be assigned to report to them?
- Are induction candidates likely to go to their assigned MEPS? What are the implications if they do not?
- Can "swing areas" be identified within which induction candidates could be sent to one of several MEPS, depending upon MEPS processing capacities?

SAI utilized an estimate of MEPS capacity submitted by ASD (MRA&L), to SSS in a Memorandum on 10 November 1980 (the origin of which was admittedly somewhat obscure), but indicated a daily capacity of 18,008 for 67 MEPS utilizing a two shift mode of operation. This same Memorandum cited a "worse case" planning number of 12,500 inductee candidates per day (M+13 to M+29) to yield a training base input of 6,250 daily. That would be approximately 70 percent of MEPS capacity.⁶ SAI misinterpreted the capacity as a daily induction requirement. Assuming that the qualification rate is approximately fifty percent of those

examined, a capacity of 18,000 would yield 9,000 potential inductees per processing day for a monthly input into the services of approximately 225,000 based upon 25 processing days a month. It is difficult to recreate the service induction requirement which equates to that number but it appears to be an approximate number which was being used early in 1980 when planning was underway for MEPS manpower augmentation. The FY 1981 maximum monthly service induction requirement (between M-Day and M+180) was approximately 180,000 for full mobilization. The ASD (MRA&L) supplied capacity was not based upon the distribution of the registrant population or even a 1980 census figure, but was more likely an anticipated distribution of workload based upon an earlier census figure such as the 1970 census.

SAI compared the given capacities from ASD(MRA&L) with a distribution of the anticipated number of inductees and a mix of applicants/inductees needed to satisfy the services training requirements to determine which MEPS would be overloaded at various processing levels. SAI determined that at a processing level of 12,500 per day that only the Boise MEPS would be overloaded. However, given a national processing requirement of 18,000 per day the number overloaded would be 37 or 38 depending on the mix of inductees and applicants. Their study only examined the difference between the ASD(MRA&L) supplied numbers and the numbers SAI generated from the 1960-1961 year group registrant data file on addresses plus several variables concerning the distribution of applicants by geographical location. No attempt was made to determine the validity of the capacity numbers. Following is the table extracted from the SAI study concerning capacity.

NUMBER OF AFEES WITH AN OVERLOAD VERSUS
THE NATIONAL PROCESSING REQUIREMENT⁷

<u>National Processing Requirement</u>	Percent of True Volunteers				
	0	25	50	75	100
12,500	1	1	1	1	2
14,000	2	2	3	3	11
15,000	3	3	5	11	15
16,000	9	9	15	19	22
17,000	22	22	23	25	29
18,000	37	38	35	38	37
19,000	53	53	48	45	43
20,000	59	60	57	54	50

Based upon revised training base capacities, MEPOOM has revised mobilization plan 1-82 and the supporting mobilization Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) to reflect an average daily processing load of both 14,500 and 18,000. The lower figure represents a partial to full mobilization level and the latter a full mobilization level supportive of increased training base capabilities. In addition, manning levels for each MEPS have been revised to correspond with the registration demographics. Using the SAI rationale, the revisions should ensure all MEPS can fulfill the mobilization workload at a processing level of 18,000.

As far as the other two policy questions that SAI sought to answer, they determined that the differences between the registration address and current address of the registrant would have little impact on MEPS workload capabilities. Lastly, that it was possible to identify "swing areas" or geographical locations which could be directed to report to a MEPS for processing which is not necessarily the closest to the inductee's home. However, SAI felt the shifting of workload could best be accomplished by the MEPS commander or the temporary increase or shift in staffing to counter projected workload changes for a given period of

time.

Syllogistics, Inc. Studies. Over the past two to three years, Syllogistics, Inc. has conducted three mobilization studies for Selective Service, MEPCOM or a combination of the two. In the first, Syllogistics evaluated the SSS/MEPCOM interface during full mobilization and proposed the establishment of Joint Augmentation Units (JAUs) composed of recently retired military personnel to provide the mobilization staffing augmentation required.⁸ The proposal was adopted and implemented by OSD and the services have identified personnel to fill most of the positions and issued appropriate mobilization orders.

A second study completed in January 1981 examined ten MEPS under peacetime conditions and identified requirements needed to satisfy mobilization requirements. The general consensus of that report was that with selected upgrading of facilities, equipment and staffing each of the ten could be capable of meeting the mobilization requirement.⁹

The third study was initiated in May 1981 and completed in January 1982. The purpose was to make an assessment of the adequacy of the mobilization plans of ten MEPS and to determine the capability to process the average daily mobilization workload plus surges of up to fifty percent, and validate the JAUs TDA manpower authorizations. The detailed specifics of the study included: staffing limitations; physical plant layout; processing flow patterns; equipment or other resources; logistical support; and contingency planning that might preclude handling the assigned mobilization workload. In addition, they were to identify limitations when there was a ten-, fifteen-, twenty-five-, and fifty-percent increase in workload.¹⁰

Following is Syllogistics' summary assessment of MEPS capabilities:

"As a general observation, all ten of the AFEES (MEPS) can meet their assigned mobilization workloads. If some improvements are made to the current mobilization plans, this capability holds true even when the workload is increased by fifty percent."¹¹ Specific recommendations were provided to each MEPS involved and MEPCOM Headquarters.

Syllogistics also examined the processing of female volunteers under mobilization conditions, following an OSD determination in January 1980 that female volunteers could be substituted for males on a one-for-one basis commencing at M+60. They concluded that a bottleneck would arise with simultaneous processing and thus either separate processing days or time would have to be established or else certain medical functions would need to be eliminated or transferred; i.e., eliminate the breast and pelvic examinations, transfer x-ray, orthopedic exam and urinalysis to the reception centers.¹² Syllogistics commented further on these aspects in their January 1982 report. Some of the findings were discussed in Chapter III.

Other specific comments of Syllogistics have been incorporated into other applicable portions of this paper.

MEPCOM Mobilization Planning.

MEPCOM/MEPS Mob Plans. Following the Selective Service link-up in the fall of 1979, MEPCOM began several mobilization initiatives: (1) a computer interface between MEPCOM and Selective Service following the December 1979 OSD decision to establish a Joint Computer Center to serve the needs of the standby Selective Service System and to provide MEPCOM with both peacetime and mobilization capabilities which were not available within the limited constraints of the computer system which was being operated by US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) for USAREC and MEPCOM; (2) revision of Chapter 9 ("Processing of Selective Service

Registrants"), Army Regulation 601-270, a joint service regulation on MEPS Operations; and (3) determining the ability and improving the capability of the MEPS to process mobilization workloads.

In January 1980, MEPOOM formed a study group of selected MEPS Commanders and members of the staffs of the Headquarters and the three regional Sectors to examine the peacetime processing actions and staffing. This study effort culminated in April 1980 with the briefing of the Manpower Policy chiefs of each of the services and the Assistant Deputy ASD(MRA&L) for Military Personnel Policy. A detailed narrative report was submitted to the Army (OSD Executive Agent for MEPOOM), each service, the Service Recruiting Commands, and OSD on 21 April 1980. The study effort sought to develop a new staffing guide related to workload for each of the individual processing steps for each MEPS based upon workload for both the preceding calendar and fiscal years, together with a projection of average annual workload to be accomplished for the succeeding five fiscal years.¹³

The staffing guide was accepted by all services with only minor administrative adjustments. The study highlighted to each service the processing functions/missions which had been accepted since MEPOOM was organized in October 1976, which had never been resourced; functions which could be eliminated or transferred back to the services to save manpower spaces; as well as efficiencies in the recruiting/processing interface. Rather than reduce services being provided or change recruiting/processing procedures, the services, at the insistence of OSD, reluctantly supported the additional staffing for MEPOOM.

Manpower space authorizations and funds were top-loaded into the Service Program Objective Memorandums through the Program Decision

Review process commencing in FY 1982 (476 spaces). An additional 20 spaces were authorized commencing in FY 1981 to support the Joint Computer Center activated at Great Lakes, Illinois in the spring of 1981. (No manpower spaces were transferred from USAREC to compensate for the mission change!) These increases not only enable peacetime processing to be enhanced, but provide a stronger posture to initiate mobilization.

In the fall of 1980, a mobilization working group consisting of eight MEPS commanders, a representative of each sector headquarters, and selected members of the MEPOCOM staff gathered at Fort Sheridan to build the framework of a MEPS Mobilization Plan which could be issued to each MEPS Commander and then tailored to fulfill the unique requirements of each MEPS. This group spent three weeks working in sub-groups on the various facets of the plan and addressing specific questions to the MEPOCOM staff. The draft model plan was forwarded to each commander in December 1980 for their review and use in developing a detailed plan for their MEPS. In May 1981, the command sponsored a national mobilization conference in Tampa, Florida to discuss mobilization issues and assist the individual commanders with their plans. As previously discussed, a contract was issued to Syllogistics, Inc. to assess the written plans of ten MEPS to determine their capability to perform mobilization level workload.

MEPOCOM subsequently completed the revision of Chapter 9, AR 601-270 and submitted it to HQDA for staffing among the services. The draft Chapter 9 was submitted by HQDA to ASD(MRA&L) on 12 February 1982 and was utilized in Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD during April-May 1982. Publication by OSD is pending.

MEPOCOM issued their Mobilization Plan 1-82 which has been revised

in accordance with training base capacities rather than training requirements.

Interface was established with Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to obtain a mobilization priority for the transportation of new accessions (inductees and applicants) to the reception stations. In addition, there is an on-going interface with HQDA and TRADOC to refine mobilization procedures for delivery of new accessions to the reception stations and the training base.

MEPCOM has identified a number of mobilization issues which need policy guidance/direction. They have initiated a procedure of periodically submitting selected issues through ODCSPER to ASD(MRA&I) for resolution. Five letters have been submitted since November 1981 which have received minimal response, other than to indicate that the matters are under study at OSD. Following are some of the issues:

- establishment of a peacetime working group of the Military Mobilization Manpower Accession Committee (MMMAC).
- refining the mobilization flow-control system.
- standby legislation to waive the limitation on the number of Category IV personnel accessed as imposed by the Defense Authorizations Acts.
- uniformity of offense classification.
- delegation of 4-F classification authority to SSS.
- allocation of conscientious objectors to all services.

Each MEPS was required to develop a mobilization plan and submit it to higher headquarters for review by September 1981. These plans have been reviewed and returned to the MEPS for finalization and incorporation of missing or insufficient data. Ten MEPS mobilization plans were reviewed and verified by Syllogistics, Inc. The evaluation criteria developed by Syllogistics has been utilized in the review of

subsequent plans.

Adequacy of the Joint Augmentation Units JAUs. As previously cited, Syllogistics, in a study performed for the Selective Service System, recommended that the mobilization augmentation of the MEPS staffing be accomplished by the assignment of recently retired military personnel. This recommendation was submitted to mobilization planners at OSD. MEPOCOM was consulted concerning manpower staffing required to support the service training requirements and OSD provided additional staffing for both a surge capability and the realization that the workload could not be evenflowed into each MEPS due to the constraints of the need for "uniformity" in the administration of the Military Selective Service Act. OSD approved JAU staffing was 5,524 spaces from the four services plus the peacetime staffing of 3,230 spaces, for a total mobilization authorization of 8,754 spaces. The mobilization authorizations were incorporated in MEPS TDAs in June 1981, and later revised in October 1981.

Syllogistics in their assessment of the mobilization processing capability of the ten MEPS studied concluded that the manpower staffing was sufficient to perform the stated workload plus a potential surge of fifty percent. Certain manpower savings could be achieved by a combination of leap-frogging personnel to perform certain processing functions rather than having individual(s) assigned to each particular function and by staggering the work hours of various staff sections to correspond to anticipated workload; i.e., the processing section is workload dependent upon the processee completing the mental, moral, and medical examinations and since those procedures require considerable time it is useless to have the processing section idle or working non-productive hours.

During Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD, a HQDA contractor observing the exercise at the Raleigh (NC) MEPS posed the question of training JAU personnel. When OSD directed the establishment of the JAUs in March 1980, they also directed MEPOOM to train those personnel during peacetime utilizing existing resources. MEPOOM's response was that peacetime resources could not be shifted from support of service recruiter current missions. Approximately \$1.4 million was requested in subsequent budget submissions to support initial and recurring training of half of the JAU force every other year. HQDA failed to recognize this requirement. In the Fiscal Year 1982-1983 Command Operating Budget, MEPOOM proposed an alternative to the need for training funds. They proposed elimination of the current procedure of having JAU personnel report to the MEPS between M-day and M+7 and then be sent to a reception or mobilization center for in-processing back onto active duty which would take approximately four days. Instead, JAU personnel would report to the MEPS between M-Day and M+3 and upon arrival be in-processed by MEPS personnel utilizing prepositioned forms and instructions so that they could begin on the job training to ensure their proficiency prior to commencing mobilization level workload with the arrival of the first inductee on M+13.¹⁴

Since the author was also the drafter of the MEPOOM Commander's Statement cited above, there is some prejudice in the option recommended. I continue to believe that it is cost effective not to train JAU personnel during peacetime. Likewise, I believe it is foolish to send them for active duty in-processing to a mobilization station which will already be taxed to capacity in-processing reserve component units. Further since all personnel reporting to a mobilization station become assets of the installation commander it is possible that the personnel

would be diverted to other missions and not be available to process the mobilization workload in the MEPS. Mobilization stations have insufficient clothing for retirees and military clothing is not essential at the MEPS. Administrative personnel in the MEPS are familiar with the personnel and financial requirements of the joint services and could be easily trained in the service requirements for in-processing retirees prior to mobilization based upon prepositioned service unique instructions and forms.

MEPOOM advised the author that since the onset of the study the services have generally concurred to in-process JAU personnel in the MEPS with the exception of some Air Force locations.

In December 1981, ASD(MRA&L) requested MEPOOM through HQDA (ODCSPER) to develop a staffing guide for mobilization, modeled on the approved peacetime staffing guide. And to ascertain the staffing required to process a combination of inductees/applicants according to current training base capacities rather than previous training base requirements. On 17 March 1982, MEPOOM forwarded a staffing guide for mobilization workload in draft form to HQDA for staffing and approval by the four military service departments. The combination of the staffing guide, a determination that nurses would not be authorized and the reduced workload based upon training base capacity rather than requirements has resulted in 1,085 spaces being identified as excess to the current mobilization TDAs. However, there is an indication from ASD(MRA&L) that the staffing authorization should continue to be based upon training requirements (18,000 daily processing load) on the contention that the services may be able to increase the training base capacity and it is easier to defer calling JAU personnel to active duty than

it would be to locate assets once they have been assigned to other mobilization positions. The author supports the retention of current JAU TDA authorizations, less the nurses, as supportive of TRADOC efforts to purify the training base capacity and determine MOS training requirements.

MEPCOM traditionally has planned for the use of one physician for every 40 male physical examinations. GAO in their 1979 report utilized a ratio of 1 physician per every 30 examinations performed. Syllogistics in the January 1982 report cautioned that examinations, interviews, and profiles performed by physicians may be a processing bottleneck. Due to the age of the retired military doctors, Syllogistics recommended that a listing of fee-basis physicians be maintained and updated annually for MEPS surge capabilities.¹⁵

An analysis of the draft mobilization staffing guide for the medical section indicates that an allowance of a maximum of 40 examinations per physician is utilized. A minimum of two physicians is authorized for the smallest workload - one per shift. Physicians are added in increments of two to provide an equal capability on each shift. Therefore, a workload range of 80 to 159 examinations authorizes four physicians; their individual workload could vary from 20 to 40 exams each. It is my opinion that the staffing guide is sufficient for determining the regular complement of physicians; however, I support the contention of Syllogistics that a roster of fee-basis physicians be maintained to provide assistance on a routine or surge basis as locally required. My brief observation and the opinion of a data collector at Raleigh during Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD was that the physicians were getting stressed with the volume and prolonged processing -- thus 30 males medicals per physician is a reasonable planning factor. However, the medical exami-

nation administered during the Exercise was an IRR retention physical and could have consumed more of a physician's time than would an induction physical during mobilization. It must be remembered that in many MEPS during peacetime there is only one medical line per shift and fee-basis physicians do not work a full shift for their fee. Thus, a person of comparable age having to work twice as long during a mobilization shift could create a strain for a prolonged period. I believe this is an area which requires further study.

Workload Shifts. As indicated in the SAI study, workload cannot be established on a uniform basis among all MEPS. The inductees will report to a designated MEPS based upon the random sequencing of names of registrants born on a particular birthdate chosen by lottery. Although the MEPS have adjusted staffing and other procedures based upon an average workload anticipated from the registrant data file, the distribution of birthdates and names will probably not follow an exact geographical pattern. Likewise, the scheduling of applicants serves as the basis for notifying Selective Service of the number of inductees required after M+29, but there cannot be a correlation of the numbers of each category to coincide with the average capacity of the MEPS. It is for this reason, that planning must include a capability to support workload surges above the daily average.

The MEPS have developed their mobilization plans in a manner to minimize confusion in the station. Since most MEPS are situated in commercial leased facilities with minimum expansion capability within existing structures, plans have been developed for the reception and staging of personnel to be processed in areas outside the MEPS. In many instances, space for the administration of the full ASVAB have also been

planned outside the MEPS. Thus, the MEPS area will be devoted primarily to medical examinations, service classification, and final MEPS processing. As previously discussed, applicants will be aptitude tested prior to reporting to the MEPS thereby permitting immediate medical processing. Since complete processing could take up to 15 hours from initial arrival until departure on outbound transportation to a reception station, it is essential that some processing steps be completed prior to the start of each processing day. Selective Service is studying the feasibility of administering the ASVAB to conscientious objectors at MET sites to reduce the load on in-house processing.

Even though steps are being considered and planned to reduce the need to process all personnel by MEPS personnel, there will be times when the capacity of a given MEPS is exceeded. Depending on the numbers and the frequency of the occurrence, there are several steps which can be taken. For small infrequent happenings, the personnel which cannot be completed within a given day can be held over night in the contract lodging facility and finished the following day. Although inductees will have priority over applicants once they arrive at the MEPS, in reality the applicants will have completed part of their processing prior to arrival whereas the inductee will require total processing. The MEPS are also planning on testing inductees who arrive at the contract lodging facility the night before.

If the number to be processed greatly exceeds the capacity, the MEPS commander after consulting with his headquarters can transport a portion of the workload to a MEPS which is being under-utilized. For continuous overloads, there needs to be a shift of MEPS boundaries placed in the Selective Service computer program to have a portion of the inductees report to other than the closest MEPS. SAI termed the

latter the identification of "swing areas."

This problem of controlling the flow of inductees/applicants will be the most challenging faced in daily mobilization processing.

Joint Optical Information Network (JOIN). USAREC is in the process of developing, testing and fielding a new recruiting sales/information/communications system (JOIN) to 2,200 of their recruiting stations in the 1982-1983 time frame. One mobilization use has been resolved, which is for Selective Service to use the communication system at 436 area offices (Service Recruiting Stations). USAREC also proposed that each of the 2,200 sites be used as mini-MEPS to qualify registrants thereby saving the cost of transporting registrants to the MEPS. Little if any consideration seemed to be given to the need for medical personnel to conduct physical examinations in accordance with current standards.

MEPCOM was established in 1976 as the "honest broker" in the qualification of service applicants. This mission is as viable today as it was in 1976 and will remain important in mobilization while ensuring equity in service assignments and approving moral waivers. The Military Selective Service Act, as amended, places great emphasis on uniformity and equity in its administration. Conducting physicals in 2,200 locations with fee-basis physicians and medical technicians and contracting for x-ray, audio and laboratory services would be extremely costly and have little confidence of uniformity. Coordinating on-bound transportation to service reception stations from 2,200 examining sites would be a nightmare. This concept should have little merit among any who fully comprehend the role of the MEPS during peacetime and the interrelations of Selective Service, MEPCOM, and the service training base during mobilization.

Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD.

Purpose. The stated purpose of Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD was:

- To evaluate the plans, policies, procedures, organization and systems used by MEPOCOM to receive, process, and make Service distribution, and induct qualified registrants into the Armed Forces during full mobilization.
- To evaluate Department of the Army plans, policies, procedures, systems, and organizations related to:
 - Selection, processing, and accession of individuals for entry into the U.S. Army during full mobilization.
 - Skill classification, assignment to training, and processing of Army accessions for entry into the expanded training base.¹⁶

The basic question being asked was could the MEPS process a mobilization level workload given simulated conditions and mobilization staffing levels.

Originally the Exercise was to be conducted in December 1981 utilizing Army Reservists playing the roles of registrants, applicants, and DEP-outs. In November 1981 it was learned that Active Duty for Training (ADT) funds for the participating reservists either would not or could not be made available. A decision was made to tentatively reschedule the Exercise for 20 February 1982 with a fall-back position being in conjunction with MOBEX 83. On 12 January 1982 at a meeting at HQDA it was decided to use Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members designated by RCPAC to act as registrants, applicants, and DEP-outs for the accession processing portion of the exercise and to reschedule this phase of the Exercise until 1 May 1982. The reception station/training base portion or phase of the exercise would only involve two mobilization sites which currently perform OSUT -- Fort Knox and Fort Jackson. Fort Campbell, a US Forces Command installation designated as a mobilization reception station/training base, was eliminated from playing the Exercise. The

participants for this phase of the exercise would be individuals scheduled to enter active duty from the DEP during the period 12-13 May 1982 for selected training sites and they would be processed into Fort Knox during the period 14-16 May 1982 at a level to simulate full mobilization processing. Fort Jackson's participation was limited to the processing of an equivalent number of records. Following exercise processing, the participants would be administratively shipped to the training site they had originally been contracted for.

To obtain sufficient IRR support, RCPAC surveyed those areas of the country which had a sufficient IRR population which they felt would be responsive to volunteering a day in exchange for a normal day's pay, travel expenses, and the administration of an IRR retention physical examination, which is required for IRR participation. The number of sites and MEPS locations were modified partially to coincide with RCPAC capabilities. RCPAC sent letters to IRR members requiring retention physicals to solicit their assistance on a voluntary basis. The list was refined based upon the responses received. Follow-up notices or calls were made the week prior to the exercise to ascertain that sufficient volunteers would be available to simulate a single shift mobilization workload in each of the six MEPS selected (Baltimore, Raleigh, Milwaukee, New Orleans, Houston and Seattle). The number of IRR participants required to simulate mobilization workload for the six sites was 912. RCPAC had anticipated that more than 1,000 would participate based upon the preliminary responses received. The number of participants was 493 or 54 percent of the workload required to simulate one mobilization shift for the six sites. The qualification experience at one MEPS was 25 percent failure for the retention physical and 10 percent for the aptitude test using mobilization standards -- 10 per-

cent would have been classified in mental category V and disqualified for military service. IRR support in this exercise casts a doubt in my mind concerning the reliability of the IRR in satisfying a portion of the trained manpower requirements of the nation.

The exercise was to be a no-fault exercise in order to gain an insight into improvements required and current capabilities. In the following section which contains my observations at the Raleigh MEPS, several examples are utilized as a means of highlighting problems with mobilization planning which may require more consideration throughout the system. The staff at the Raleigh MEPS was very professional in the conduct of the exercise and were extremely helpful throughout the course of my visits with them. The observations listed may differ from the official Exercise After-Action Report which will be submitted after completion of this study.

Raleigh MEPS Observations. One of the objectives of the exercise was to determine the capability of the MEPS to handle a mobilization level workload for one processing shift of approximately 10 hours. This was equated to a floor count of 103 personnel, consisting of applicants (16), DEP-outs (10), and inductees (77). The mix was to equate to the real-world mix that could be expected after M+30. There was initially some confusion since several days before Raleigh had expected the mix to be 5 applicants 5 DEP-outs, and 93 inductees.

By 0800 on 1 May 1982, the designed time IRR members were to report for orientation, a total of 53 of 103 personnel had arrived. By 0900 an additional 16 personnel had arrived. One additional straggler arrived at 1000, bringing the total IRR personnel in station to 70. The RCPAC and control personnel split the group into 16 applicants, 5 DEP-

outs, and 49 inductees. Processing of the initial group started at 0910, a few minutes later than had been planned.

Pre-Exercise Planning. During the weeks preceding the exercise, the Raleigh MEPS staff developed a player flow plan with approximate time sequences for actions to occur. Part of the reasoning was to coordinate the use of the dining facility area as a testing room for inductees 0900-1215, serving the noon meal 1230-1330, a second ASVAB session for inductees 1400-1700, and finally the evening meal 1730-1930. This was an artificially introduced queuing problem for this specific exercise since the Raleigh MEPS mobilization plan has designated the contract lodging facility in downtown Raleigh as the reception/staging area as well as the area used for the administration of the ASVAB. The contract facility is used for breakfast and dinner during peacetime and could serve lunch during mobilization to those personnel completing the ASVAB prior to being transported to the MEPS for the medical examination and final processing.

Processing folders were prepared for IRR players which contained the processing flow sequence and projected times, and the following forms: Computer processing worksheet, Applicant processing worksheet, Statement of Law Violations, and Application for Enlistment. Under actual mobilization these same forms would be in the processing folder for each individual in addition to Standard Forms 88 and 93, Statement of Medical History and the Medical Examination forms. For the exercise, SF 88 and 93 were given to the individual in the medical section.

Raleigh MEPS prepared a list of possible mobilization events from the Exercise Directive. For each event it listed the action which might occur, the point of contact for resolution, the detailed references by paragraph and document, and a brief synopsis of the type of actions

which might be required. The concept was to provide a quick reference source for their personnel so that they would not have to thumb through a number of documents. In checking with the Raleigh MEPS staff and the evaluation of the data collectors this quick reference document proved to be extremely useful.

Dependents Accompanying Registrants. Although not anticipated, several IRR members arrived for the exercise with their dependents. Since exercise processing was accomplished solely within the MEPS, the dependents had little alternative but to sit around the station for the duration of the processing day, which lasted longer than most expected.

This matter was discussed with the Selective Service Liaison Officer who stated that he was going to recommend to National Headquarters to add a strong discouragement statement to the SSS induction mailgram. An associated item in the current mailgram states if commercial transportation is not available to the MEPS and the individual utilizes a privately-owned-vehicle that he must have made arrangements to have it removed from the MEPS should he be inducted and shipped to a training center.

Under previous mobilization procedures an individual was rarely examined, inducted and shipped the same day. There is a strong possibility that families will want to accompany the registrant and even the applicant to the MEPS since they do not know when they will see him again. Even if Selective Service strongly discourages dependents from accompanying registrants to the MEPS, the MEPS staff must be prepared for this eventuality. This is another reason for the MEPS to utilize staging and reception areas in a location other than the MEPS facility.

Space will be a premium in the MEPS during mobilization without the additional burden of dependents and the distraction they can cause.

Terminal Screening For Test Failures. Major Panton, a Raleigh JAU's volunteer, who is a clinical psychologist with the North Carolina Prison System had designed a terminal screen checklist IAW para 9-34, AR 601-270. He volunteered to participate in the exercise problem play. During the morning test he discovered two test failures which were not part of the problem play. Under the retest and interview criteria one of the individuals had a score within the indeterminate range which resulted in the conduct of an interview. During the interview he learned that the individual had been to a party before driving five hours to the MEPS and thus his failure resulted from a "burnout" rather than a lack of knowledge. The second individual, who under the score criteria would not have been interviewed, disclosed that he was a legitimate Category V who was in the IRR having been accessed in 1977, served three years active duty, and was recently promoted to E5 in the IRR. The clinical psychologist recommended retention to RCPAC based upon the past performance. These examples point out one item for consideration. Selective Service will order individuals to report to the MEPS at 0600 and 1300 daily. Depending upon transportation networks between their residences and the MEPS, some individuals may travel in excess of six hours and thus may function at less than full capacity upon arrival. The resultant test score may exceed the minimum score for military service but not properly reflect the capability of the individual. Such was the case of the first individual described above, who had a 12th grade education.

In discussing the matter with the Selective Service Liaison Officer, he felt that about 90-95 percent of the registrants could utilize

commercial transportation from their residence to the MEPS. However, the duration and mode of travel may be such that the individual may not be well rested. Some consideration needs to be given to determining during MEPS in-processing the last time the individual had any sleep; and, if it has been an excessive length of time that provisions be made to have him rest prior to administering the ASVAB. One item in MEPCOM Pamphlet 600-1 on "Red Carpet Treatment" is an encouragement to the recruiting service to seek to arrange transportation, lodging and meals so as to insure that the applicant is rested and not distracted during the administration of the aptitude test.

Scheduling. The general orientation for the exercise began at 0800 and was completed by 0910 when the IRR players were split into several groups. DEP-outs were sent to the medical section for a medical inspection to insure that there had not been a significant change in their medical condition so as to preclude active duty entry. Applicants were administered a full ASVAB separate from the inductees which had several ramifications: i.e., most applicants should have been pre-tested at MET sites by OPM testers IAW MEPCOM Mobilization Plans which would have permitted going straight to the medical section and then into job assignments and final processing sooner; some applicants will be straight shippers; and, some will go into a reconstituted DEP depending on school or training availability. (When the variance to the Mob Plan was posed to the MEPCOM staff by phone the response was that RCPAC had requested that all be tested.) Inductees were divided into two groups with part going to the medical section and part to ASVAB testing. The switch over was to occur at noon. The impact of this scheduling procedure was to finish the medical/testing procedures at

essentially the same time thus dumping the full processing load onto the service guidance counselors.

The chief controller elected to simulate the afternoon ASVAB for those medically examined in the morning in order to release some inductees to the guidance counselors early. The testing records were dumped, but unfortunately in an improper sequence. Service guidance counselors created interpreted scores for insertion into REQUEST Mobilization System (RMS) without benefit of the raw scores which are utilized by MEPCOM's Accession Reporting System (ARS). The raw score is a two digit score and the interpreted score is a three digit score. A raw score is very difficult to back into from an interpreted score. Thus, there will be a disconnect when comparing the records of the two systems.

Chapter 9, AR 601-270 specifies applicants will have precedence over inductees for the scheduling into the MEPS after M+29, but once in the MEPS inductees have priority. When both an inductee and an applicant record were available for processing it was the applicant record which was handled first. It must be remembered that the personnel involved are familiar with applicant procedures whereas induction processing is slightly different.

Following the morning DEP-out processing, both the service guidance counselors and the MEPS processing section were underutilized until the afternoon when the personnel had completed both the medical and aptitude testing. After M+29 the MEPS processing section can begin certain record building for applicants previously administered a MET site ASVAB while the individual is completing his medical examination. Thus, the exercise created some artificiality which would not exist under actual mobilization conditions. It was noted by one data collector that the

MEPS staff did an excellent job of processing and obtaining moral waivers but then failed to provide this information to the service guidance counselors -- a coordination problem.

A Proper Evaluation?. The consensus of the controllers and data collectors at Raleigh was that the MEPS could have fulfilled its mobilization requirement. However, since the simulated workload did not materialize from IRR volunteers (70 out of 103) it was not possible to demonstrate the capacity by the complete processing of a comparable workload. Individual procedures and plans were evaluated and verified. Since the MEPS was not permitted to contract for the out-of-station facilities which are a part of the station mobilization plan, the exercise required the use of in-house facilities for reception and testing which would not be utilized during mobilization.

The interface with Army guidance counselors at Raleigh resulted in some individual problems, such as test scores being simulated, and moral waivers data not being provided by the MEPS. A big question in my mind had been the capability of the REQUEST Mobilization System (RMS) to assign training seats with the greatly expanded mobilization level workload. Only 41 records were reviewed and data extracted for machine entry. The remaining workload was arbitrarily being entered to simulate a full processing load when USAREC notified the counselors to cease data entry after 2000 hours. Therefore, I am not convinced that individual assignments can be accommodated during mobilization by RMS.

In the opinion of members of the MEPCOM staff, the exercise did not provide conclusive evidence that the MEPS can in fact process the mobilization level workloads due to the low IRR participation. Thus, there will be those who believe that it can be accomplished as well as those

skeptics who will contend that the MEPS remain the limiting factor for mobilization.

Houston was the only MEPS to process workload during GRAND PAYLOAD portraying all services. One problem area which surfaced in processing was the lack of uniformity in applicant/enlistment packets among the services. Each service wants not only different data in the packet but also wants it assembled in different sequences.

Classification Procedures

Service Assignment Procedures. The assignment of draft volunteers and inductees to a particular service will be performed by MEPCOM utilizing procedures contained in para 9-36, AR 601-270 and summarized below. Each service will receive the quality distribution needed to sustain the force. Personnel will be placed in the five mental categories based upon the AFQT composite percentile score. Each service notifies ASD(MRA&L) through a control staff working for the Military Mobilization Manpower Accession Committee (MMMAC) of the need for inductees for future periods which when added to their enlistments scheduled for the like period will provide the forces which can be accommodated by the training base. This information is forwarded to MEPCOM to determine the percentage allocation of inductees to be assigned to each service. The service totals are submitted to Selective Service which uses the daily requirement to determine the level of the induction call by day for the same given period.

Registrants are offered the opportunity to rank order their preferences for military service. After the AFQT scores have been determined, alphabetical lists will be compiled by computer for each mental category which will also contain the service preferences. Where possi-

ble a registrant will be given the service of his preference, but this will be a factor of the service requirements for the period. If service requirements cannot be fulfilled strictly from registrant preferences from each category then arbitrary assignment will be made from those registrants which did not list any preference. If the allocation is still insufficient, then every fourth name on the alphabetical list will be screened to determine if the shortage service was the second preference of that registrant. If so, the registrant will be assigned to that service. If that process does not generate enough personnel then a similar procedure will be followed starting at the bottom of the lists. The procedures employed will attempt to assign a registrant to a service which was either his first or second preference. However, the needs of the services may dictate an arbitrary assignment. While the daily allocations may not match exactly each service's needs a cumulative listing will be maintained so that for a month's allocation adjustments will be made for equalization.¹⁷

Service Guidance Counselors.

Functions. During peacetime the service guidance counselor evaluate the qualification of the service applicant based upon the results of the ASVAB and various special tests which may be administered in the MEPS. This information is compared via computer terminal with the service job requirements and the training school availability. The counselor then attempts to sell the applicant on the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for which he can enlist. Thus, the past USAREC terminology that the recruiter sold the service and the guidance counselor sold the job. Depending upon the timing of the school availability, the applicant is enlisted for immediate entry on active duty or placed in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP). For the Army the computerized

assignment program is termed REQUEST and is operated by the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) in Alexandria, Virginia.

During mobilization the procedures will operate slightly different. An individual who has not received an induction notice can either apply for a specific service or can volunteer for the draft, rather than wait to be inducted. The timing as to when a person is "draft susceptible" has not been finalized. It could be the determining factor in order to get the services to agree on the continuation of recruiting by only one or two services during mobilization. As was mentioned in an earlier chapter, each of the military services is concerned about getting a fair slice of the "quality" market to fill the various technical positions. There has been some reservation expressed that the Air Force, for example, by continuing recruiting during mobilization might pull off too many upper mental category personnel who would rather enlist for the Air Force than face being drafted for the Army combat arms. To insure that each service obtains a fair share of the upper mental category registrants it may be necessary to establish a date or a listing of the lottery generated birthdates which are most susceptible for induction and declare those personnel not eligible to enlist for a specific service. Apparently Selective Service and OSD have agreed that once an induction notice is mailed, which establishes an examination date, those registrants are no longer eligible to enlist for a particular service.

Procedures for service guidance counselors to process applicants will be similar to those employed today other than the assignment to a school requiring the highest technical qualifications or aptitude. This may be limited due to the fact that the MEPS will not be administering special qualification tests. Service applicants enlist for a specific

length of time, which is usually longer than the conscription period, and are required to meet higher qualification criteria than an inductee. An applicant may not qualify to enlist in a particular service but still may be qualified for later induction in a military service.

Utilizing the Army as the example, upon declaration of full mobilization the guidance counselor will cease processing new enlistments unless those that are pending can be finalized and accessed prior to M+13, final screen all eligible DEP-outs who are not in a postponement status similar to that applying to inductees and renegotiate the DEP following the accelerated input to the training base. Those in the DEP which possess a valid postponement will be rescheduled for active duty entry following the completion of the postponement. Guidance counselors will process applicants prior to M+12 and subsequent to M+29. They will process all applicants and inductees through the REQUEST Mobilization System to obtain a match of the individuals qualifications against those required or desired for MOS training. The system will perform the classification function and will make the assignment to a training center. RMS has been designed to handle large volumes of data within the normal processing time the registrant will be in the MEPS. RMS is also supposed to capture additional personal information to build a record on the inductee, which can be utilized by the training base as an initial service record. (This is a duplication of the purpose of the Accession Reporting System (ARS) which MEPCOM operates for all services. More will be discussed on this duplication in a following section) Guidance counselors will also compare civilian acquired skills which may qualify the applicant for specific military MOS by using DA Pamphlet 601-51. Guidance counselors are informed by the MEPS staff of any moral waivers which were granted which could affect the job eligibility of the

inductee.¹⁸ Thus, the function to be performed by any service guidance counselor is an abbreviated form of the actions which they perform today but with a greatly expanded workload and in much less time. The functions performed by one service are similar in nature to those of other services. Since the guidance counselor duties are somewhat vague and there should be more uniformity among the services, AR 601-270, which is a joint service processing regulation, could be expanded to specify these duties, especially during mobilization.

Staffing. Guidance counselor staffing in peacetime is for a single shift operation, five days per week. Therefore, mobilization will necessitate an increase in the guidance counselor staffing for most of the services. MEPCOM in July 1981 requested the services to identify the additional staffing, space and processing requirements at the MEPS during mobilization. The Air Force responded that they believed that their mobilization requirements relying primarily on volunteers for enlistment would be similar in both function and requirements to current peacetime operations.¹⁹ The Navy responded that while additional working space would not be required that they expected to employ at least a 50 percent increase in the number of job classifiers and twice the number of liaison petty officers.²⁰ The Marine Corps indicated that additional personnel would be provided from the current recruiting force and some additional space would probably be required - exact numbers were not furnished.²¹ The Army provided some tentative numbers to MEPCOM but stated that the list would be adjusted following the experience gained from Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD. The Army Reserve will continue to have a classification mission during mobilization and can be expected to add addition counselors.²²

Training Assignment Procedures. As previously indicated, the training assignment options as far as other service training locations is concerned are more limited than the Army. The Air Force will continue to rely on all initial entry training being performed at Lackland Air Force Base. The Navy will perform initial entry training at Orlando, Great Lakes, and San Diego. The Marine Corps will conduct initial entry training at Parris Island and San Diego. The Army will conduct OSUT at 15 sites and Basic Training at 14 sites - Fort Benning will offer only OSUT.

Shipment of accessions for the Air Force will all go to the same location. It is assumed that Navy and Marine Corps accessions will be distributed on a regional basis following either transportation route accessibility or the closest MEPS to the training site. For the Army the problem becomes more involved due to the greater number of sites as well as much larger accession numbers. The Army's training locations will be determined by RMS using the match of individual qualification and MOS requirements. RMS is supposed to employ a geographical discriminator but it apparently malfunctioned during Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD. Utilizing the distribution pattern generated by the Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD RMS computer program, the Raleigh MEPS would have shipped personnel for infantry OSUT to five different training sites: Fort Polk, Fort Dix, Fort Benning, Fort Jackson and Fort Ord. The Army currently plans on using eight infantry OSUT bases, three armor OSUT bases, two artillery OSUT bases, engineer OSUT at Fort Leonard Wood, signal OSUT at Fort Gordon. Several OSUT bases will serve more than one career field. There needs to be a way of programming the RMS to queue shipments on a geographic basis to simplify the distribution of inductees while easing the demands on the transportation network. Several of the larger MEPS

which have an excellent transportation network, such as Chicago, New York and St Louis, could be used as "swing areas" to balance out the requirements of the various Army training sites.

Back-up Assignment Procedures. I have previously questioned the capability of the RMS to respond to the mobilization workload and perform all the tasks which will be demanded of it. Likewise, others have questioned the reliance which is being placed on centralized computer systems. For whatever the reason, contingencies must be prepared in the event that these systems become non-operational for a period of time since the processing functions must continue. Annex F, MEPCOM Mobilization Plan 1-82 contains disaster and overflow procedures. As part of the procedures, RMS will be shut down for a day if it is inoperative for two or more MEPS for a period of two or more hours. Service assignments and shipping will follow a manual distribution by percentage to various training sites, usually one per service other than Army, for most MEPS. TRADOC provided MEPCOM with an alternative distribution plan with a regional orientation, which is attached as Appendix 1. Alternative MEPS have been designated by county should a prolonged overflow or a disaster occur. In the event of failure in the communication or transportation systems, the MEPS will ship all accessions to the nearest military installation. They will later be transshipped to their proper locations.²³

Data Base Creation


Selective Service - MEPCOM. During 1979 when Selective Service was studying various options to upgrade their ADP capability for mobilization planning, but not considering a daily operational registration support mode, they explored the feasibility of linking up with either a

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - 1963 - A

recruiting service or another government agency. They concluded that a service recruiting command link-up was not politically feasible. USAREC was providing computer support to MEPOCOM, which also needed additional processing capability. During mobilization, MEPOCOM would have a daily link-up with Selective Service by first obtaining lists of registrants who would be reporting to the MEPS for induction processing and then MEPOCOM would be providing feedback information to Selective Service of the results of the qualification process and those registrants which failed to show. Since MEPOCOM was the qualifying agent or "honest broker" for OSD in the recruiting process, this link-up was deemed politically palatable. A decision, previously referenced, was made to create a Joint Computer Center to serve the needs of both agencies but managed by MEPOCOM. OSD provided the majority of the financial resources for the JCC. The JCC is located in a Navy building at Great Lakes, but separate from the Naval Training Center. It is currently contractor operated with each agency having an internal management staff. Each agency controls its own data base with strict safeguards imposed on the Selective Service data base to satisfy Congressional interests. Computer tapes are generated for the use of other agencies and each other and information is passed between data bases by computer. The site utilizes an IBM 370-168 main frame computer. Current state-of-the-art hardware has been programmed to replace the existing main frame in FY 1985. Selective Service stores and updates all registration files from this site.

MEPOCOM operates the official Accession Reporting System (ARS) for OSD from this site as well as scoring and processing all ASVABs administered at educational institutions. This site is linked to the 67 Mili-

tary Entrance Processing Stations and three subordinate regional control headquarters. During mobilization, Selective Service will maintain a data link to its 434 area offices which are currently service recruiting offices. MEPCOM maintains a record of all service applicants for the past two years, which also serves as the qualifying time for the institutional ASVAB.

System 80 Mini-Computer Interface. MEPCOM is in the process of installing Sperry-Univac System 80 mini-computers in each MEPS, one at each of the regional headquarters, and two at its headquarters. The installation will essentially be complete in the fall of 1982; the exception being several MEPS which are in the process of being relocated to new commercial leased-space. Several of the MEPS are currently on-line with the System 80 installed in the JCC at Great Lakes. The two System 80's installed at Great Lakes have a magnetic tape capability. The minimum capability leased for the MEPS System 80's is 67 Mbytes of removable disc storage, 112 Mbytes of fixed storage, and .5 Mbytes of working storage. The system will operate on a batch processing mode between the MEPS and MEPOOM HQ with cycles every four to six hours. The three regional commands will be the back-up processing sites for the MEPS under their command in the event of data link interruption into the headquarters.

Each MEPS will be provided a down-load of file data on each individual processed. Based upon the Selective Service projection list of inductees and service projection lists of applicants scheduled into the MEPS for the following day, the JCC will provide each MEPS the updated data file for all individuals contained on any of the following days' projection lists. The MEPS data file on individuals being processed will be updated throughout the processing cycle as each step is com-

pleted. Once the individual is qualified and assigned to a training center, the MEPS System 80 prints both page 1 of the DD Form 1966, which is the ADP Worksheet, and DD Form 4, which is a three page enlistment contract. Once the assignment to a training center has been determined, the System 80 could formulate data for the Service Reception Stations on the incoming accessions to include time of arrival, carrier, and MEPS of origin; in addition, there will be all the pertinent individual personal and qualification data necessary to create the personnel files via a computer to computer interface rather than the manual system utilized at both the MEPS and reception stations today.

TRADOC was to test the System 80 at one or two Reception Stations during Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD. Current ADP support for Army Reception Stations is outmoded or non-existent.

USAREC and MILPERCEN have been examining RMS with a file builder capability to provide the personnel data needed by the Reception Stations. TRADOC has expressed an interest in there being a dual-source data base and for USAREC to operate the back-up system. TRADOC seems to favor a System 80 interface with MEPCOM as the primary system.²⁴ The USAREC concept would feed all data to the Army Reception Stations by AUTODIN using card format. Both methods were to be tested during Phase II, Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD on 14-16 May 1982. The results of the test were not available for this study.

The System 80 installed in the Oakland MEPS easily processed 500 records during a single shift one day in April 1982, which is in excess of a two shift mobilization requirement.

Back-Up Computer Processing Sites. As stated above, the three regional command headquarters will serve as decentralized back-up pro-

cessing sites for the MEPCOM Great Lakes System 80. In addition, an additional cost determination of providing greater permanent data storage capability at the MEPS is underway so that they could maintain a permanent data file on all individuals processed for a year or two.

The back-up site for the JCC is the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California.

MEPS Support Capabilities

One of the key ingredients of the MEPS capability to process a mobilization workload for a sustained period is its support posture. The MEPS rely on decentralized support for peacetime operations since most of them are some distance from supporting military installations. Where practical and feasible, local purchase authority is granted, although usually requiring verbal authorization from the supporting Purchasing and Contracting Officer.

Transportation support is provided from limited military vehicles, primarily an overage bus and carryall fleet, GSA vehicles, and local support in the form of contract buses or local commercial transportation. This transportation is utilized mainly to move applicants from the lodging facility to the MEPS for processing and at the end of the day for moving accessions to commercial out-bound transportation terminals for shipment to the Reception Stations. During mobilization, there will be additional requirements for movement between the MEPS and reception/staging/testing areas, as well as movement of larger numbers of personnel to commercial terminals. Where possible in current lodging contracts, a provision is included for the lodging facility to provide transportation from the commercial terminals to the lodging facility for in-bound applicants and the following morning from the lodging facility

to the MEPS.

In addition to transportation, the MEPS is responsible for managing the meals and lodging program for the recruiting services during peacetime (recruiting services are billed for the direct cost of providing meals and lodging to their respective applicants). During mobilization, this is a cost to be borne by Selective Service and MEPCOM (for the Defense Department) depending upon the registrants' status at the time the service is provided. However, MEPCOM will manage the service and decentralize execution to the MEPS. On all new contracts issued for these services, there is a mobilization clause inserted so that space will be provided either by the prime contractor or can be sub-contracted to the extent that the mobilization requirements exceed the capability of the prime contractor.

Each MEPS has been authorized to maintain a 60 days mobilization level stockage of blank forms and authority has been granted for local reproduction of many forms. Administrative items are obtained from either military self-service stores or GSA sales stores.

Medical support comes from the nearest military installation. One key factor during mobilization will be the maintenance of certain items of medical equipment, especially x-rays and audiometers. There have been too many problems with x-rays, especially the Fisher X-ray, during peacetime processing. However, an accession can be shipped without an x-ray. An audio test must be performed prior to induction. Medical equipment procurement is managed by The Surgeon General, US Army. Past procurement contracts have specified a processing volume on a daily basis which has been interpreted to be a full processing day. However, the processing volume is usually completed in a one to three hour period. Mobilization will involve the sustainment of peak processing

for ten to fourteen hours per day. I have serious reservations whether the equipment is capable of sustaining that volume without a high rate of equipment failure.

To sustain the mobilization workload, the MEPS will require a high degree of responsiveness from their various support activities. I envision the need for the Supporting Purchasing and Contracting Officer to delegate limited authority to the MEPS commander or his designated representative.

CHAPTER IV

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CHAPTER V

TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS

During full mobilization the transportation assets of the nation will be severely exercised in the deployment of active forces and high priority reserve forces in support of contingency operations. In addition, late deploying reserve component units will be moving to mobilization stations. Now we must consider the movement of applicants and registrants both to the MEPS for processing and then the onward shipment of qualified accessions to the reception stations and the training base.

Requirements For National Transportation Assets

During 1979 and 1980 the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) pursued the various actions which would be required to assure timely support for the movement of essential personnel and cargo during a national emergency and increasing requirements leading up to a declaration of a national emergency. Prior to that time "statutory procedures to give military shippers priority for commercial lift during periods short of a national emergency were unclear."¹ These initiatives resulted in what is now referred to as the MTMC Contingency Response (CORE) program. The authority is derived in large part from the Defense Production Act of 1950 (as amended).² MTMC-CORE is a program to expedite commercial lift in support of deploying units and other associated

activities during mobilization or national emergencies. A response team composed of members of the various modes of commercial transportation and various federal agencies are available on a moments notice to provide the decision link from MTMC Headquarters in Baileys Crossroads, Virginia for the employment of the nation's commercial transportation assets.³ In summary, the CORE program provides the procedures for locating the national assets required and insuring their availability without delay in support of national priorities. The program concept was tested in a command post exercise (CPX) conducted 8-11 September 1981 with participants including MTMC area commands, several federal agencies, and association and carrier representatives from the surface and air transportation industry. The CPX, at least conceptually, established that CORE is fully capable of fulfilling its stated purpose of ensuring DOD receives priority commercial transportation services to include air, bus, and rail passenger and cargo movement during defense contingencies.⁴ This study poses the question as to the level of centralized control which will be exercised over the assets and to what extent will routine scheduling be available for recurring requirements such as will occur with induction processing?

Registrant Transportation: Home to MEPS

The mailgram which will serve as the induction notice will include a travel warrant authorizing the registrant to utilize commercial transportation from his home address to the designated MEPS for induction processing. The registrant will surrender the travel warrant to the commercial carrier in exchange for a ticket. Should a carrier not be available or refuse to accept the warrant, the registrant is expected to travel to the MEPS at his own expense and he will apply for reimburse-

ment from the Selective Service Liaison Officer on-duty in the MEPS. Individuals will be instructed not to bring a privately-owned-vehicle to the MEPS unless he has made prior arrangements to have it removed or disposed of. Otherwise the government will have to arrange for commercial storage and a power-of-attorney for the disposition of the vehicle if it was not properly claimed within a set time.

Registrant Transportation: Return of Disqualified Registrant

If a registrant upon examination by the MEPS has been determined to be disqualified for military service, he will be issued a travel warrant from the MEPS to his home address. The cost of this transportation is borne by Selective Service. If, in the course of processing, it becomes necessary to return an individual to his home temporarily the transportation will be arranged by MEPCOM as the agent for Selective Service.

Inductee Transportation: MEPS To Reception Stations

One weakness discovered early in 1981 by the working group developing the MEPS Mobilization Plan was transportation when daily shipments would be four-fold the current experience. MTMC was not represented at the Tampa Mobilization Conference in May 1981 but did present a CORE briefing to the October 1981 MEPCOM Commanders' Conference. On 13 October 1981, MEPCOM requested MTMC assistance in developing the MEPS transportation plan. MTMC was provided the weekly mobilization input by training center through M+90, the projected daily MEPS output by service, and a notional destination and passenger load for each MEPS for day M+18 which did not adhere to the Army OSUT training concept.⁵ This was followed on 21 January 1982 with a request (MEPCOM to MTMC) for assignment of a transportation priority designator for accession travel

and the resubmission of the 13 October 1981 data in an INCONREP format.⁶ MEPOCOM made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain RMS distribution data in support of Army OSUT to input to MTMC.

Depending upon the service reception station/training center the inductee has been assigned, the MEPS will arrange transportation through MTMC by commercial means - air, rail or bus. The mode of transportation will depend upon the demands of higher priority movements on the nation's transportation assets. Although the airline industry contends it has the aircraft to support the mobilization requirements, a MTMC representative estimates that approximately 60 percent of accession travel will be by commercial air and a greater use will be made of bus service — primarily charter.⁷ On 22 February 1982, MTMC issued a movement table in support of inductee/applicant travel to reception stations based upon a notional input from MEPOCOM which did not fully support the Army OSUT training concept. This movement plan was not given a transportation priority designator. None has been issued by DCSLOG, HQDA. Some consideration has been given to designate accession travel a Priority 4 designator, which is the lowest mobilization movement designator code.⁸ The rationale for issuing a Priority 4 is the individual is an untrained asset. However, when compared to the other personnel in this category (dependents, personnel otherwise eligible for movement, personnel of non-DOD activities) the new accessee should be afforded a higher priority for movement, i.e., a Priority 3 (personnel returning from emergency leave). Peacetime reception station restrictions on receipt of trainees after 2400 hours will be lifted upon mobilization. The number of personnel and the time of the day will also be factors in determining the type of transportation to be employed.

A HQDA contractor (Systems Research and Applications, Inc. of Arlington, VA) has questioned the ability of MTMC to handle most MEPS shipments on an exception basis during mobilization. They are recommending that the peacetime procedure of establishing Passenger Standing Route Orders (PSRO) from each of the MEPS to the applicable service reception stations be utilized. A peacetime PSRO blocks a predetermined number of seats on a number of specific flights. Under mobilization if Army OSUT is controlled on a geographical basis, then some prediction can be made as to destinations, approximate time of the day and an approximate passenger load. Thus, only exceptions to the seat requirement, destination or time of the day would have to be handled by MTMC on an exception basis. There appears to be a difference of opinion within MTMC on the feasibility of developing mobilization PSROs today. MTMC is reluctant to formulate mobilization PSRO's during peacetime due to the frequency of the changes being experienced because of competition among the carriers for recruit travel changes in carriers and service, and frequent fare adjustments.⁹ It would be helpful in adjusting passenger blockings if MTMC was linked to MEPCOM by a System 80 mini-computer, so that the individual MEPS did not have to rely solely on normal telephone circuits to obtain transportation arrangements. System 80 could also be tied to the airline reservation system. Earlier, they were not receptive to the author's suggestion of establishing a mobilization PSRO and updating it on a monthly or quarterly basis.

Cross Boundary Shipments To Adjust MEPS Workload

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the uncertainty of the processing workload among applicants and inductees may result in selected MEPS being overloaded on given days. Depending upon the size of the

overload and the resultant backlog in processing and its possible effect for inductees on the "uniformity" in administration of the MSSA, it may become necessary to ship sizeable numbers of personnel by commercial sources from one MEPS to another which is under-utilized on that particular processing day. Such movements would have to be handled with MTMC on an exception basis unless there was another MEPS in a near vicinity. Short distance movements which could entail the use of a commercial bus might be left to local arrangements by MEPS personnel. Such factors will depend on the magnitude of the demands on the transportation assets and the latitude provided local carriers. A MTMC representative is of the opinion that controls will have to be imposed on the bus industry due to increased demands resulting from the diversion of commercial aircraft to support mobilization at least in the first few months.¹⁰

Some indication of potential workload shifts could be derived in advance if Selective Service did a matching of potential delivery lists by ZIP codes identified to the MEPS to check numbers against capacity prior to finalizing the delivery listing and issuing the mailgrams. This could serve to alert MEPCOM as well as serve to shift boundaries if an experience factor can be correlated with a high degree of predictability.

Implication Of Army Training Policy

The Army currently plans on continuing One-Station-Unit-Training (OSUT) wherein basic training and advanced individual training are intermingled into one continuous period of training. However, the Army will also be conducting separate basic training and specialized training courses (AIT).

The transportation implications are that under the former mobiliza-

tion reception station concept (World War II), an inductee was shipped to the closest reception station from his induction point and once there was given further tests to determine specific training. Groups of inductees were moved from the reception stations to training sites.

Under OSUT, the Army will operate fifteen reception stations throughout the nation. While most of these sites will conduct combat arms related training, the assignment system as previously discussed can assign an individual to any of the fifteen sites. There is a possibility of individuals inducted on the west coast being shipped to the east coast for OSUT when a similar site might be available on the west coast. This can be partially corrected if the Army would program the REQUEST Mobilization System (RMS) to direct an individual to the nearest OSUT site for the duty field inducted or enlisted. Even with this RMS modification it is conceivable that each MEPS will ship to seven Army Reception Stations in addition to one each for the other services.

The other services do not pose nearly the problem due to both the smaller number of inductees/applicants involved and the limited number of training sites they employ.

Unit Shipments: Direct Deployments Versus POE Shipments

During the USAWC Mobilization Advance Course in the spring of 1982, a guest speaker mentioned the fact that it was necessary for his unit (minus equipment previously deployed), to move from a staging area by commercial air transportation to an aerial port of embarkation for overseas deployment. He questioned the need for two stagings with the second staging occurring while awaiting overseas aircraft. It seemed logical that overseas capable aircraft of commercial design which would transport passengers and personal belongings rather than any outsized

military equipment could stage from a suitable commercial airport near the initial unit staging or mobilization area. This would save the use of short haul commercial aircraft in moving from the staging area to the POE as well as reducing the vulnerability of limited POEs. One of the alleged difficulties was the US Government mobilization contract with the CRAFT fleet specifying the Air Force is responsible for aircraft maintenance and thus it is necessary to marshal the aircraft at central points designated by the Military Airlift Command. Another reason given was the limited number of Air Force departure airfield control units to handle the loading and use of special equipment. Passenger movements should not involve any special equipment other than that which is normally found at commercial airports servicing DC-10, L-1011, 747, and similar type aircraft. The author posed this question to MTMC to interface with MAC but no answer was received.

CHAPTER V

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER VI

RECEPTION STATION PROCESSING

Although the slippage of Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD until mid-May 1982 precluded an extensive coverage of the capabilities of the reception stations to process mobilization workload as originally envisioned for this study, sufficient data was collected concerning the interface between MEPCOM and TRADOC as well as the differences in requirements of the training base and current training base capabilities to formulate the following discussion.

Development of Requirements

As discussed in Chapter II, the training base requirements stem from the demands of the force structure developed to execute a postulated national security objective. The need for trained manpower to execute national security is not questioned! What is questioned is the capability now to attain the requirement and if not currently attainable what is being done to correct the condition and the length of time to achieve the desired posture.

The following table compares Army FY 81 Requirements, Army FY 82 Scenario Requirements, and the OSD recognized Army training base capabilities. The Army FY 81 Requirements and OSD recognized training base capabilities were portrayed in Chapter II together with those of the other services. The FY 82 Scenario Requirement is the M-Day to M+180

Post Mobilization Individual Training Requirement and consists of initial entry training inputs to OSUT and Basic Training.

ARMY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS/CAPABILITIES

<u>Period</u>	<u>FY 81 Rgmt</u>	<u>FY 82 Rgmt¹</u>	<u>Capability</u>
M to M+30	133,191	95,050	88,900
M+31 to M+60	133,894	175,825	56,601
M+61 to M+90	65,648	135,270	46,678
M+91 to M+120	132,191	131,240	72,275
M+121 to M+150	131,944	157,500	56,601
M+151 to M+180	<u>49,005</u>	<u>125,820</u>	<u>46,678</u>
Total	645,843	820,705	367,733

The Scenario 82 depicts training by week by training installation for Basic Training, OSUT and AIT. Following is a monthly summary through M+6 months:

TRAINING CENTER CAPACITY FOR INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING SCENARIO - 82

<u>Month</u>	<u>Basic Training</u>	<u>OSUT</u>	<u>BT/OSUT</u>	<u>AIT</u>
1	39,050	56,000	95,050	88,431
2	63,250	112,575	175,825	58,271
3	53,350	81,920	135,270	36,380
4	47,300	83,940	131,240	34,074
5	56,375	101,125	157,500	41,388
6	45,100	80,720	125,820	32,124

One fact becomes readily available when one studies this aspect of mobilization—the numbers seem to constantly change. One other fact

seems certain--TRADOC does not have the current training capability to satisfy the FY 82 Scenario Requirement. In an interview with a TRADOC representative, he indicated that the OSD recognized training base capability figures are not even attainable today; however, current Program Objective Memorandum (POM) funding will permit those levels to be attained.

Reception Station Activation

During mobilization the Army will operate fifteen reception stations for OSUT and basic training. Eight are currently OSUT or basic training sites, one (Fort Gordon) is an advanced individual training site, and six are currently US Forces Command (FORSCOM) installations (Ft Lewis, Ft Ord, Ft Polk, Ft Bragg, Ft Hood, and Ft Campbell). Activation of new training centers will be accomplished by USAR Training Divisions which will also be used to augment the current assets of the peacetime TRADOC training base. Training resources available to TRADOC include 12 USAR Training Divisions, 2 AIT Brigades, 87 USAR Schools and 11 Reception Stations.² Mobilization assignments for these units are contained in Volume III, TRADOC Mobilization and Operations Planning System.

One problem picked up during the study was the timing of the activation of new training centers by the USAR Reception Stations/Training Divisions. The HQDA requirement to TRADOC is to have all Training Centers (15) operational and prepared to receive inductees on M+13. This will involve Reception Station processing commencing on M+13 with actual training commencing about M+17. For some USAR Training Divisions going to a FORSCOM installation this seems like an almost impossible task--their preference would be M+30 which was the plan prior to Selec-

tive Service revitalization and peacetime registration. Although the Reception Stations and Training Divisions deploy to the training centers commencing upon the declaration of full mobilization, they are not required to have all of their units closed-in until M+6 for the Reception Stations and M+10 for the USAR Training Divisions. Thus, there is little time for site preparation prior to the arrival of the first inductees. Previously, Selective Service was not required to deliver the first inductee to MEPCOM until M+30.

The decision to use six FORSCOM installations rather than smaller TRADOC installations was made in about 1976, since the FORSCOM installation had an organic base support structure. The smaller TRADOC installations will be used by FORSCOM as staging areas for Reserve Components. TRADOC envisioned a three-phased expansion during mobilization. First, the expansion of the existing training base by the use of USAR training organizations. Second, expansion of installations to include the six FORSCOM installations. Third, spreading the training base to sustain full wartime operations. The third phase would not occur until sometime after M+180. The second phase will occur almost simultaneously with phase one.

Reception Station/Training Center Capability

Expansion of the training base on existing TRADOC installations is far simpler than will exist on FORSCOM installations. For instance, TRADOC installations for the most part have the ranges and training sites which are designed for training new accessions and scheduling of those facilities will become one of the major problems to be sorted with expanded training. FORSCOM installations are far more limited on the type of ranges and other training sites are geared more

for unit training and maneuver than they are for individual and small unit training. In addition, FORSCOM installations lack a training support structure since units are required to provide most of their own training support.

All FORSCOM installations will be required to deploy active force units assigned to the installation and be prepared to stage and deploy selected numbers of reserve component units. FORSCOM installations are more sensitive to unit deployments and the timing of such deployments is critical to the implementation of initial entry training at the six FORSCOM installations, as they will use the cantonment areas of deployable units. Late deployments could jeopardize the timely establishment of the expanded training base.

USAR Training Divisions have limited equipment authorized and on-hand today. FORSCOM installations do not have equipment on their installations earmarked for the USAR Training Divisions to use in the training of new accessions. FORSCOM units deploying overseas to POMCUS (Prepositioned Material Configured for Unit Sets) equipment will leave in-place their peacetime assigned equipment. The PURE (POMCUS Unit Residual Equipment) becomes the property of FORSCOM to redistribute according to its priorities. There has been a difference of opinion among guest speakers to the USAWC Mobilization Advanced Course as to the disposition of this equipment. However, one HQDA spokesman stated that HQDA will pull off the top items required for special purposes and some to support the training base prior to letting FORSCOM make a redistribution of the remainder. Thus, some equipment will be available for use by the USAR Training Divisions but probably not in the quantities desired.

As was mentioned in an earlier chapter, MOBEX 80 criticized the

Army for training more tank crewmen than there would be equipment to operate. This appears to have been an inherent weakness in Army mobilization planning. However, steps are underway to correct this situation. The Army has conducted a study called MOBADS—Mobilization Army Distribution of Systems—which determines the prioritization of what-you-have between the battlefield and the sustaining base. Action is also underway to correlate the need for personnel with the equipment which is expected to be on-hand along with the mix of the various types or generations of equipment. Force modernization complicates the training requirements as the new equipment in most instances is not eliminating equipment in the inventory due to the shortages in the Reserve Components. It is just increasing the number of courses to be taught in both the operation and maintenance of the equipment. This is necessary in planning for the numbers of personnel which must be trained on each type of equipment and the subsequent development of mobilization POI (Programs of Instruction). Another factor in the POI development is the need to expand the training program since units will not be able to complete initial entry training as is expected today. The Infantry training week will be expanded from a 40 hour/12 week program to a 60hour/13 week program. This is necessary to insure that the individual is fully MOS qualified.⁴ When the equipment density requirements and projections are married with the revised POI then both the requirements and the training base capabilities will be changed again. This is not to say that the requirements will not change once hostilities commence because they will. The casualty rates may be different than had been predicted as a result of the modernization of conventional weapons systems and capability of the maintenance system to repair battlefield

equipment losses, i.e., artillery losses may be greater than previously experienced due to the greater accuracy of long-range weapons system and laser technology.

According to a TRADOC representative, a fairly real-time interface is required between the reception stations and MEPCOM.⁵ One criticism contained in the Linton Study (cited earlier in this paper) was that it was

essential that SSS, MEPOOM, the AFEES (MEPS) and the Training Establishments be able to interchange data with systems that are compatible and that they develop a program that is common from registration to delivery of the inductees to the training base.⁶

So far, the interchange of data and the systems interfaces have been accomplished between three of the four elements mentioned. The System 80, if installed in the TRADOC Reception Stations, has the capability of completing the system linkage Linton cited and can accomplish the data transfer between commands/agencies on a timely basis. This would eliminate the manual creation of personnel records which is practiced today. MEPCOM has expressed a willingness to adjust some previous concepts of System 80 interface to permit data access by TRADOC and the Reception Stations. As previously mentioned, System 80 in the MEPS permits almost a continuous building of a data file on the individuals being processed as they complete the various steps in the qualification process. When the individual has been given a training assignment through the REQUEST Mobilization System (RMS) this data will also be entered in his data file. While the System 80 is completing the enlistment contract and other final processing is being completed the transportation clerk in the MEPS will be ascertaining the time and routing of the individual to the service reception station. This data can also be included in the data file with minor programming adjust-

ments. Assuming the central MEPOOM data base is updated at least every four hours, this information would be available for the TRADOC Reception Stations to access on a central or regional basis and obtain both a listing of the shippers to their Reception Station and the data file on each for creation of a computer generated training record. The list of shippers could contain both the time of arrival and the carrier.

A System 80 interface between MEPOOM and the Service Reception Stations may obviate the need for a dual source data base as envisioned by USAREC, especially if the dual source data is not available on a timely basis and is processed in a different format.

If the transportation experience of Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD is a valid indication of the carrier capabilities, other than chartered bus, then most of the individuals completing processing after 2000 hours will probably have to be held over until the following day due to limited airline flights scheduled after that time for many MEPS. It is only the larger metropolitan areas which will enjoy flexibility in shipping times.

Although it was not the intention of this study to dwell on the capability of the training base, it should be noted that past studies have highlighted the differences in the Army requirements as stated in the force structure and the capability to perform the training in terms of facilities, training companies and equipment. The US General Accounting Office in the two reports cited in Chapter IV on MEPS Capacity also cited the inadequacies of the training base to accomplish the workload due to a shortage of training companies in the USAR Training Divisions as well as the equipment shortages alluded to earlier in this Chapter. There is an additional factor which must be considered. Many of the

training companies of the USAR Training Divisions lack the expertise needed to train new accessions. An effort has been made to improve the assigned strength posture of the training divisions and from a numbers point of view it was fairly successful. However, some of the USAR Training Divisions may lack the depth of senior NCO's to function as Drill Sergeants. One guest speaker at the USAWC Mobilization Advanced Course suggested that the geographical area assigned to the Training Divisions be expanded in order to provide them a larger base population to draw from and thus take advantage of overages in NCO's which exist in some units. In addition, the capabilities of the USAR Schools may not have been fully explored. The USAR Schools are due to close into the training centers by M+20. All but ten of the 87 schools have been given specific missions. However, the orientation of many of the USAR Schools has shifted over the past couple of years to enlisted rather than officer training. Thus, there may be a capability to use the USAR Schools both to train the trainer of the Training Divisions and to augment the cadre of the Training Divisions.

On 22 January 1982, the Department of the Army Inspector General released a Memorandum for the Chief of Staff which stated that "The current ARMY Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT) for mobilization, which is assembled by the Army Staff and TRADOC, requires a training load impossible to accomplish."⁷ This was partially due to the use of outdated and unreliable data. A number of deficiencies were cited and action was recommended to correct the deficiencies. TRADOC and the Army Staff have initiated actions to improve the mobilization capabilities of the training base. However, some of the items cannot be corrected without the infusion of resources--both equipment and funds. Due to ever-present budgetary constraints, decisions will have to be made as to

the priorities for limited resources--current operations or improving the mobilization posture. Until such time as the mobilization posture becomes a viable situation, then planners must be aware of the constraints on the availability of trained manpower required to project national power. This item will be addressed in more detail in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER VI

ENDNOTES

1. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC FY82-83, A Perspective, p. 11-5.
2. Ibid, p. 11-3.
3. Interview with Don Skinner, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, 8 April 1982.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ray A. Dunn, Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations Mobilization Capacity, p. 21.
7. US Department of the Army, Inspector General, Report of Inspection, Army Training Base Expansion During Mobilization (ATBEX-M) -- Decision Memorandum, p. i.

CHAPTER VII

MOBILIZATION POLICY AND GUIDANCE

Although each of the military departments are concerned about their own mobilization issues — primarily the deployment of active forces and the assimilation of reserve components into the active force and their subsequent deployment — they must be attuned to the front-end processing procedures during mobilization since it is the implementation of those procedures which will input to their training base. While Selective Service as well as MEPCOM have been refining their internal mobilization procedures, problems with interfacing these agencies/organizations with the military departments in coordination with OSD still appears to have some ragged edges. These edges can be smoothed by the coordination of efforts. The time to smooth the edges is now, during peacetime, rather than waiting for the confusion which will be associated with mobilization to set in.

DOD Military Mobilization Manpower Accessions Committee

OSD by a policy memorandum directed the establishment of the DOD Military Mobilization Manpower Accessions Committee (MMMAC) during mobilization to control the induction process and assist the interface between Selective Service, MEPCOM and the military departments in fulfilling the input requirements to the service training base. MEPCOM proposed to ASD(MRA&L) through ODCSPER in November 1981 that a peacetime

working group be formed of the participants on the MMNAC so that as issues arise in mobilization planning that they can be discussed and solutions proposed on a working level without always having to seek formal coordination among the services which can easily become a lengthy staffing procedure.¹ So far, ASD(MRA&L) is studying the implications of such a working group and attempting to insure that the proper charter is developed for such a group. One thought has been to make it a sub-element of other inter-department working groups for peacetime processing operations, i.e., the ASVAB Steering Committee, etc. ASD(MRA&L) reasoning is that many of the Key Players (senior civilian and military officials) already meet periodically to resolve similar issues and it might be proper to group many of the various Steering Groups under a single charter to include mobilization issues and then have the subordinate working groups be structured along functional lines.² I find no fault in the concept, but only in the length of time required to make a decision and implement it. In the meantime, more issues are being developed and forwarded through channels for resolution and they are piling up on some action officer's desk and gathering dust as he shakes off the alligators biting at his ankles.

Another thought of OSD was to request a contractor examine the problem and to recommend a forum for resolution and potentially supervise or oversee on-going operations. While I recognize that staff reductions may necessitate farming out some work to contractors, we also seemed to have acquired the notion that their input is required to obtain a creditable product. During this study I happened upon an undated study proposal from the Accession Policy Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics which

had as one of its four sub-objectives:³

- Oversee Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPCOM) capabilities, issues and initiatives/improvements
 - interface with MEPCOM and oversee for ASD(MRA&L) MEPCOM policies and operations
 - review, and where appropriate, take issue or defend MEPCOM program initiatives during POM and budget reviews

It is my opinion that OSD would be abrogating one of its primary missions by contracting to accomplish the cited sub-objective and that a contractor has no business being involved in the development or defense of program and budget issues. As Director of Resource Management for MEPCOM (1979-1981), I was able to interface with the Army Staff as Executive Agent. And when necessary, to interface directly with both OSD and OMB on both financial and manpower issues as well as with each of the services on manpower authorizations.

Several issues have been cited throughout the paper which need resolution. These include a determination of whether recruiting during mobilization will be permitted for only one or two services and how or do you offset the potential quality disparity? Another question is the method of inserting volunteers for the draft (those individuals not applying for a particular service but are not sitting at home waiting to receive an induction notice) together with service applicants, inductees and conscientious objectors. Guidance is for them to initially report to the local board if they desire to volunteer for the draft rather than to report to the MEPS. I assume that the local board will notify SS National Headquarters of the request and issue the registrant a reporting date for several weeks hence and this action will serve to reduce the level of the induction call for the same period.

Controlling the flow will be one of the most difficult problems to

be faced during mobilization processing unless a predictable pattern or correlation develops between the location and numbers of applicants and inductees. The unpredictability of the response to the Selective Service induction call produces many uncertainties for the first month of mobilization processing. While the MMMAC may not be able to crystal ball this potential problem, a working group ought to be able to arrive at some "what if's" which hopefully would improve mobilization planning.

Requirements Versus Capability Implications

I do not fault the need for planners to develop force structures to carry out national objectives and the military strategy which supports those objectives. However, I have the impression that we often lose sight that the resources needed to support that strategy most often are lost in the budget process even if they survive the POM process. Thus, a disconnect occurs between requirements and capabilities. The force structure remains on the books as a requirement but the filling of the force structure results in a void, which was cited by Army Chief of Staff Meyer as "the hollow Army." The force structure may exist, but the capability for the force structure in terms of manpower and equipment is such that the fighting potential is reduced. I recognize that we have many examples of units displaying great courage and determination in overcoming sizeable odds when their fighting posture might be questioned. And I also recognize that in the future we will deploy units in less than an optimum posture because they will be required. But, when doing so we must remember that we are committing a unit at less than full potential and thus the aggregate capability of the force is somewhat reduced.

Likewise, the sustainability of the force must be questioned due to

the shortfall in lift, both air and sea, not only to position the force in some forward area of interest but to properly support that force once it is in place. In the Army school system and as a part of studies and simulations it is easy to assume away the "too hard to handle" in order to make the problem more interesting, or to insure an outcome which satisfies the purpose intended by the sponsor. Unfortunately, it is the real world—the here and now—that we must deal with should such a situation arise which necessitates the declaration of a national emergency and the implementation of full or even partial mobilization procedures.

Finally, the timing of a decision will be most important. An early decision by the National Command Authority is essential to properly support — mobilize — and deploy assets considering our other limitations.

We can see the predicament which Great Britain finds itself in today trying to support a force in the Falklands and what in time may prove to be its relative lack of capability to project and sustain power outside its immediate geographical sphere of influence—mainly western Europe. There are a number of lessons to be learned as we examine the potential utilization of the Rapid Deployment Force. I surface this issue only to caution that we have a history of "can do" philosophy; while I do not advocate the abandonment of such an attitude, I believe that it is wise for planners to recognize current capabilities when presenting policy options to the National Command Authority.

CHAPTER VII

ENDNOTES

1. US Military Enlistment Processing Command, Military Manpower Accessions, (Letter to DASD (MRA&L-MP&FM), 20 November 1981.
2. Interview (telephonic) with Tom Sicilia, US Department of Defense, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, 26 April 1982.
3. US Department of Defense, Managing the Flow of Military Accessions. (Proposed study effort of the Accession Policy Office), undated.

CHAPTER VIII

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The format followed in this chapter will highlight each of three sections according to the major activity grouping to which they were associated in the presentation of the paper—Selective Service, US Military Enlistment Processing Command, the training base and others. I recognize that many have overlapping implications, but I have used this order as a means of subdividing the sections.

Findings

Following are the findings which resulted from the examination of the Selective Service System and their preparation for mobilization.

- O Selective Service has developed the capability to conduct a national lottery, issue an induction call, and adjudicate claims through a local board system which is in being today.
- O Selective Service maintains a viable interface with MEPOCOM on a daily basis through both the Joint Computer Center at Great Lakes as well as a Liaison Officer at the National Headquarters.
- O Selective Service is unable to precisely determine the level of induction call which must be issued to guarantee the required qualified input to the training base. Previous studies by HUMRRO and Linton cite the Selective Service call as being too high. However, the call is in line with OMB and CBO studies. The one area which may be overstated by Selective Service is the mental rejection rate when WWII standards are compared with prior draft periods. The SS medical rejection rate is acceptable assuming

the OSD contention that Chapter 2, AR 40-501 standards are essentially those which existed in January 1945.

- O Although busily engaged in the process, Selective Service would have difficulty implementing an Alternate National Service Program today without considerable sponsorship of jobs on the part of the federal government.
- O Selective Service could enhance processing by conducting a computer generated ZIP code analysis for MEPS capacity prior to mailing induction notices. In addition, Selective Service and MEPCOM should work together to identify registrants with previous MEPS processing.

The findings concerning the processing operations primarily involve MEPCOM and are as follows:

- O MEPCOM has made great strides in mobilization planning in support of accomplishing the projected accession workload to include the development of Headquarters and MEPS Mobilization Plans which are thorough and practical, the development of Mobilization TDAs to incorporate the use of JAUs personnel, and the development of a Mobilization Staffing Guide which HQDA has staffed with four services for approval. Only minor technical adjustments are required prior to OSD submission.
- O The current fill of the JAUs positions by the four services is not complete. Agreement has been reached to in-process JAUs personnel within the MEPS except for certain Air Force personnel. Training of JAUs personnel can be accomplished in the MEPS between M+7 and M+13. Peacetime training of JAUs personnel is not cost effective.
- O The physician authorization for JAUs may require augmentation for more than 30 exams per physician. Augmentation should be by use of fee-basis physicians as local conditions demand. The upper range of the staffing guide (20 to 40 exams each) may be excessive depending on the physician's age and the strain of continuous interviews and examinations.
- O With minor exceptions the volume of equipment in the MEPS appears to be sufficient to process the mobilization level workload. However, the reliability of some of the equipment, especially the Fischer x-ray, could result in a high equipment failure rate when operated at peak rates for extended time periods. In addition, audiometers may also have a high equipment failure rate. Past procurements have cited daily workload in the specifications but have not indicated that the workload must be accomplished in one to three hours of the total processing day. Mobilization workload is a four-fold demand on the equipment.
- O Completion of the installation of the System 80 minicomputers will greatly enhance MEPCOM's processing capabilities both in

peacetime and during mobilization. However, the system has the capability for further enhancements.

- O Public Law 97-86 authorizes the Administration use of Social Security Administration files to enforce registration. The US Court of Appeals has directed the District Court of the District of Columbia to reconsider the case of *Wolman v. United States* in view of P.L. 97-86. The District Court had ruled against the Selective Service in requiring a Social Security Number for registration.
- O Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD highlighted areas for improvement and verified the validity of some procedures but it did not test actual mobilization plans in all respects nor did it resolve the MEPS workload capacity issue.
- O Unless charter transportation is utilized, most individuals whose processing is not completed until after 2000 hours will have to be held overnight at the MEPS until the following morning. Five of the six destinations for the Raleigh MEPS during GRAND PAYLOAD required holdovers for commercial transportation.
- O Dependents are likely to accompany applicants and registrants to the MEPS.
- O A number of registrants will arrive at the MEPS to take the ASVAB without adequate rest.

The following findings cover the Army Reception Stations, the capability of the Army training base, and the development of training requirements.

- O The expansion of the training base can be accommodated with moderate impact on the nine TRADOC installations currently conducting training. However, there remains some doubt as to whether the USAR Training Divisions and the associated USAR Receptions Stations will be prepared to accept the first inductees on M+13 at the six FORSCOM installations which will become training centers.
- O The training requirement input for new accessions is determined from the force structure requirements plus non-structure requirements less the trained manpower which is expected to be available. The requirement to train new accessions is greater than the current training base capability. Current POM funding is required just to achieve the OSD accepted capability. FY84-88 POM funding levels being submitted to OSD are not supportive of mobilization enhancement.
- O Training requirements will need to be adjusted once the Army Staff and TRADOC finish an assessment of the equipment which will be available to support the force structure and the

sustaining base. In addition, training PO1's are being revised to insure the new accession is fully MOS qualified when he leaves the training base during mobilization--this will necessitate an expansion of both the training week to 60 hours plus lengthening the number of weeks of training.

- O The delay in the conduct of Phase II, Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD precluded an adequate analysis and evaluation of Reception Station operations in this study.

The following findings cover the areas of transportation and mobilization policy.

- O Military Traffic Management Command plans on retaining centralized control over the movement of accessions to the training base during mobilization. Although MEPCOM requested the issuance of a movement priority designator code for accession travel early in 1982, none has been issued. MTMC has not indicated a willingness to establish Passenger Standing Route Orders for accession travel during mobilization even though a portion of the travel could be predictable especially after M+30.
- O OSD has built the requirement for new accessions based upon what I believe to be an optimistic show rate for various Reserve Components. A seventy percent show rate is anticipated for the Individual Ready Reserve. OSD has initiated a program of identifying key individuals to government and defense industries who are currently active reservists and might be considered as non-deployable in the event of mobilization. These individuals will be placed in the Standby Reserve.
- O Bureaucracy at the OSD level moves slow. A number of mobilization issues have been surfaced by MEPCOM through the Army to OSD for resolution which require an interplay between the various members of the Military Mobilization Manpower Accession Committee. A recommendation was made in November 1981 to form a peacetime working group to develop staff position which can be presented to the General Officer level policy makers. To date no action has been taken other than to study the issue and to consider having a contractor determine the role the working group can play before a formal charter is issued.
- O The JOIN system may be supportive of peacetime Army recruiting efforts and Selective Service mobilization communications requirements for area offices. Its use to permit 2200 recruiting stations to function as mini-MEPS is not feasible in providing uniform medical examinations and other standards of the MSSA as well as not being cost effective.
- O Service applicant/enlistment packets should be uniform in composition and assembly.

- O A contractor should not be employed to oversee MEPCOM policy, operations or to develop and defend program and budget submissions as OSD may have contemplated.

Conclusions

Conclusions affecting Selective Service are:

- O An Alternate National Service program is evolving but is not ready for implementation now.
- O Precision in predicting the response to an induction call is doubtful but it may be improved if Selective Service was to utilize a lower rejection rate for mental scores, i.e., the World War II level may be a better indicator than the peacetime draft experience. Medical rejection rates may be similar on the premise that current Chapter 2 standards are reflective of January 1945.
- O ZIP code analysis and use of prior-processing data files would enhance mobilization processing.

Conclusions affecting MEPCOM are:

- O Action should be initiated to have the services complete the staffing of the Joint Augmentation Units. In-processing and training procedures appear to have been resolved.
- O Mobilization planning seems sufficient to include the capability of the MEPS to perform a mobilization level workload but it was not truly tested by Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD due to the low response by the IRR.
- O Physician staffing guide for mobilization may require augmentation for more than 30 exams per physician due to the age and strain on the JAUs physicians. Fee-basis physicians provide an excellent surge manpower source.
- O Past procurement contracts have inadequately stated the performance demands for various items of equipment, primarily medical equipment. Inductees can be shipped without x-rays but not without audio exams. Tests should be conducted to determine the feasibility of a supplemental procurement of audiometers. The US Army Surgeon General may have to approve immediate off the shelf procurement of audiometers upon a mobilization declaration.
- O The present method of resolving moral waivers can be time consuming and cumbersome. In addition, there appears to be a difference between the stated policy and the procedures to be employed.
- O The processing system is dependent upon the use of an identi-

fication number whether it is a Selective Service number, Social Security Number, or a MEPCOM temporary identification number (TIN). The services rely on the Social Security Number for all pay and personnel matters.

- O Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD highlighted that MEPCOM and the MEPS must be prepared to deal with dependents who accompany the volunteer or inductee to the MEPS. Also there needs to be some consideration given to the amount of rest an individual has had prior to being administered the ASVAB.
- O System 80 has far more capability than has been currently envisioned or planned.
- O If blood typing was performed in the MEPS then service Reception Stations would possess all the data to prepare ID Tags and ID Cards in advance of the inductees arrival.
- O Late processing will necessitate charter transportation or holdovers overnight for morning commercial transportation. This will result in an expanded use of contract meal and lodging facilities.

Following are the conclusions as they apply to the training base and the development of requirements.

- O System 80 installation at the Reception Stations would provide the system and data base interface which currently is lacking and can be accomplished on a fairly real-time basis which would eliminate the manual creation of records. There would also be an additional capability for other applications. ADP support for the Reception Stations is currently outdated or nonexistent.
- O REQUEST Mobilization System was not fully tested during Exercise GRAND PAYLOAD to determine if it was capable of sustaining a mobilization workload for the assignment of training seats. In addition, the System did not respond to the queue to ship inductees for a given type of OSUT or Basic Training to the site closest to the processing MEPS which thus compounded the transportation problems.
- O The training base cannot support the requirements being imposed upon it.
- O Training requirements do not currently reflect needs based upon equipment capabilities.
- O USAR Training Division and associated Reception Stations will have difficulty meeting a M+13 operational date at the six FORSCOM installation due to equipment shortfalls. The problem will be compounded if the active duty units do not deploy on schedule.

- O A follow-on study should be performed to evaluate Reception Station operations.

Following are the conclusions concerning transportation and mobilization policy.

- O It is my conclusion that the Reserve Component show rates are too optimistic which understates the initial entry training requirements and the induction call for Selective Service. OSD needs to expedite the procedure underway to identify "key individuals" in government and defense industries who will be non-deployable during mobilization.
- O Military Traffic Management Command will not be capable of handling the transportation requirements from 67 MEPS to a number of destinations on an exception basis during mobilization. Some method of developing Passenger Standing Route Orders with limited flexibility or direct access to the local carrier representative to adjust passenger load must be undertaken. System 80 provides a capability to interface or seek an interface with the airline industry and MTMC.
- O More use of the split-draining option may be occurring than HQDA has considered. This affects both deployment status as well as AIT training requirements.
- O A number of mobilization issues with multi-service processing implications could be resolved or prepared for formal staffing through the use of a working group representing the members of the Military Mobilization Manpower Accession Committee. The use of a contractor to oversee inherent responsibilities of an OSD staff element should not be permitted. There is a tendency to study things to extremes. A prolonged study effort only delays the inevitable.
- O OSD needs to resolve the flow control of applicants (volunteers) and inductees. For sensitive reasons it is necessary to provide inductees priority over applicants in the MEPS to insure the "uniformity" of the call is maintained. However, the applicant will have completed a portion of his processing prior to arriving at the MEPS and thus he can be completed sooner. Priority may have to be restricted to those who initiate process simultaneously. This is a item which a working group could tackle.
- O The use of mini-MEPs is neither practical or feasible.

Recommendations

Selective Service should:

- O Reexamine the basis for the induction call, especially in the area of mental rejection rates.

- O Perform a ZIP code analysis of daily induction calls to determine potential MEPS' overload and possible corrective action prior to mailing induction notices.
- O In conjunction with MEPCOM, identify registrants who have prior MEPS' processing.

MEPCOM recommendations are:

- O Joint Augmentation Unit in-processsing should be accomplished for all services within the MEPS using prepositioned service instructions and forms. Training would be accomplished between M+7 and M+13.
- O MOBEX 83 should be utilized to test MEPS capacities for a minimum of a two-shift operation and demonstrating Mobilization Plan sufficiency to include the use of planned reception/staging/testing locations.
- O The upper range of the Mobilization Staffing Guide for physicians should be flexible to permit supplementation by fee-basis physicians. Further, an analysis could be made during MOBEX 83 as a prelude to a possible staffing guide change.
- O Future equipment procurements need to specify workload in mobilization terms for a day. Rigid performance standards should be adhered to. Obtain supplemental audiometers if required.
- O Request OSD coordinate with the Department of Justice for access to the National Crime Information Center data files during mobilization to verify criminal information the inductee has listed on his Statement of Law Violations.
- O Request OSD coordinate with the Social Security Administration for the issuance of Social Security Numbers to inductees at the MEPS rather than the use of Temporary Identification Numbers (TINs).
- O Expand the System 80 interface to the Service Reception Stations to permit them to access the data files for new acces-sions to their locations. Update the main data base on a frequent basis (a minimum of every four hours) so the data would equate to an on-line, real-time system and the data could be available for data file creation at the Reception Station prior to the arrival of the individual.
- O The MEPS must be prepared to handle more overnight lodgings than may have been anticipated due to holdovers for commercial transportation.
- O Procedures must be established to ascertain the amount of rest a registrant has had prior to administering the ASVAR. A

minimum of six hours rest should be provided if the registrant has had no sleep in the past twelve hours.

- O Test the feasibility of blood typing in the MEPS.

Following are the recommendations concerning the Reception Stations/Training Centers and the development of requirements.

- O System 80 should be installed in all Reception Stations. The need for a dual-source data base should be examined.
- O Additional resources should be programmed and budgeted to increase the training capacity and narrow the gap between capacity and requirements.
- O If OSUT is to continue during mobilization, the RMS needs to be queued to ship inductees to the applicable OSUT closest to the MEPS. Large MEPS such as Chicago, New York and St. Louis can be used to even the load.
- O Continue to match equipment availability to trained personnel needs.

The following recommendations apply to transportation and mobilization policies.

- O Military Traffic Management Command needs to issue or obtain from DCSLOG a movement priority designator for accession travel to assist MEPCOM with the onward movement to the reception stations. This travel should be priority 3 or higher.
- O Military Traffic Management Command needs to develop a system for the routine shipping of accessions to the reception stations in a manner similar to today's PSRO.
- O OSD needs to establish now a working group of the Military Mobilization Manpower Accession Committee to resolve on-going issues which affect multi-service processing during mobilization.
- O OSD needs to standardize the enlistment packets between the services.
- O OSD needs to purify the Reserve Component "show rates" to reflect changes in the composition of the IRR and to eliminate "key individuals" from reserve component units.
- O HQDA needs to reevaluate the affect that the split-option training is having on the deployable status of reserve component units and to reassess the resultant training requirements.
- O OSD needs to intercede on behalf of MEPCOM with the

Department of Justice for mobilization access to the NCIC data base for moral waiver processing and with the Social Security Administration for issuance of social security numbers at the MEPS.

- o OSD must resolve the flow control priority between applicants and inductees.
- o Planners at all levels must be conscious of the distinction between requirements to support a force structure and the capability of the existing force structure and the training base to project power in support of national objectives. Realistic options must be presented to the National Command Authority.

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Fort Knox	16.7	Fort Knox	12.5
Fort Wood	3.3	Fort Wood	6.3
Fort Sill	8.3	Fort Sill	6.2
Fort Bliss	8.3	Fort Bliss	12.5
		Fort McClellan	6.3
Manchester		New York City	
Fort Dix	54.5	Fort Dix	57.7
Fort Knox	18.2	Fort Knox	16.7
Fort Wood	9.1	Fort Wood	7.7
Fort Sill	9.1	Fort Sill	7.7
Fort Bliss	9.1	Fort Bliss	6.4
		Fort McClellan	3.8
Boston		Newark	
Fort Dix	54.9	Fort Dix	17.5
Fort Knox	17.6	Fort Knox	11.8
Fort Wood	7.8	Fort Wood	5.9
Fort Sill	7.8	Fort Benning	43.1
Fort Bliss	7.8	Fort Sill	5.9
Fort McClellan	3.9	Fort Bliss	5.9
		Fort Gordon	5.9
		Fort McClellan	3.9
Springfield		Philadelphia	
Fort Dix	52.9	Fort Dix	21.4
Fort Knox	17.6	Fort Knox	21.4
Fort Wood	5.9	Fort Jackson	37.5
Fort Sill	11.8	Fort Wood	5.4
Fort Bliss	5.9	Fort Sill	5.4
Fort McClellan	5.9	Fort Bliss	5.4
		Fort McClellan	3.5
New Haven		Syracuse	
Fort Dix	52.9	Fort Dix	55.6
Fort Knox	17.6	Fort Knox	16.7
Fort Wood	5.9	Fort Wood	11.1
Fort Sill	11.8	Fort Sill	5.6
Fort Bliss	5.9	Fort Bliss	5.6
Fort McClellan	5.9	Fort McClellan	5.6

	Percent		Percent
Buffalo		Richmond	
Fort Dix	57.7	Fort Knox	15.6
Fort Knox	19.2	Fort Wood	9.4
Fort Wood	7.7	Fort Sill	9.4
Fort Sill	7.7	Fort Bliss	6.3
Fort Bliss	3.8	Fort McClellan	3.1
Fort McClellan	3.8	Fort Bragg	56.3
Wilkes-Barre		Beckley	
Fort Knox	17.6	Fort Knox	13.3
Fort Wood	5.9	Fort Wood	6.7
Fort Sill	11.8	Fort Sill	6.7
Fort Bliss	11.8	Fort Bliss	6.7
Fort McClellan	5.9	Fort McClellan	6.7
Fort Bragg	47.1	Fort Bragg	60.0
Harrisburg		Knoxville	
Fort Knox	15.8	Fort Knox	19.0
Fort Wood	10.5	Fort Wood	4.8
Fort Sill	15.8	Fort Sill	4.8
Fort Bliss	15.8	Fort Bliss	4.8
Fort McClellan	5.3	Fort McClellan	4.8
Fort Bragg	36.8	Fort Bragg	61.9
Pittsburgh		Nashville	
Fort Knox	18.6	Fort Knox	17.4
Fort Jackson	32.6	Fort Wood	8.7
Fort Wood	9.3	Fort Sill	8.7
Fort Sill	7.0	Fort Bliss	4.3
Fort Bliss	4.7	Fort McClellan	4.3
Fort McClellan	2.3	Fort Campbell	56.5
Fort Bragg	16.3		
Fort Campbell	9.3		
Baltimore		Louisville	
Fort Knox	17.9	Fort Knox	17.9
Fort Wood	7.1	Fort Wood	7.1
Fort Sill	7.1	Fort Sill	7.1
Fort Bliss	7.1	Fort Bliss	7.1
Fort McClellan	3.6	Fort McClellan	3.6
Fort Bragg	57.1	Fort Campbell	57.1

	Percent		Percent
Cincinnati		Phoenix	
Fort Knox	18.5	Fort Wood	7.4
Fort Wood	7.4	Fort Sill	7.4
Fort Sill	7.4	Fort Bliss	7.4
Fort Bliss	7.4	Fort McClellan	3.7
Fort McClellan	3.7	Fort Hood	22.2
Fort Campbell	55.6	Fort Ord	51.9
Columbus		Butte	
Fort Knox	18.5	Fort Wood	14.3
Fort Wood	7.4	Fort Sill	14.3
Fort Sill	7.4	Fort Bliss	14.3
Fort Bliss	7.4	Fort Lewis	57.1
Fort McClellan	3.7		
Fort Campbell	55.6		
Cleveland		Boise	
Fort Knox	16.3	Fort Wood	14.3
Fort Wood	8.2	Fort Sill	14.3
Fort Sill	8.2	Fort Bliss	14.3
Fort Bliss	6.1	Fort Lewis	57.1
Fort McClellan	4.1		
Fort Campbell	57.1		
Detroit		Portland, OR	
Fort Knox	14.6	Fort Wood	8.7
Fort Wood	8.5	Fort Sill	4.3
Fort Benning	53.7	Fort Bliss	4.3
Fort Sill	7.3 9.5	Fort McClellan	4.3
Fort Bliss	6.1 8.5	Fort Hood	21.7
Fort Gordon	6.1	Fort Lewis	56.5
Fort McClellan	3.7 5.0		
Milwaukee		Des Moines	
Fort Jackson	31.0	Fort Jackson	61.5
Fort Wood	7.1	Fort Wood	7.7
Fort Sill	9.5	Fort Sill	7.7
Fort Bliss	7.1	Fort Bliss	3.8
Fort McClellan	4.8	Fort McClellan	3.8
Fort Hood	40.5	Fort Hood	15.4

	Percent		Percent
Fresno		Ft Jackson	
Fort Wood	5.6	Fort Jackson	66.7
Fort Sill	5.6	Fort Wood	6.7
Fort Bliss	11.1	Fort Sill	6.7
Fort McClellan	5.6	Fort Bliss	6.7
Fort Hood	16.7	Fort McClellan	3.3
Fort Ord	55.6	Fort Hood	10.0
Honolulu		Jacksonville	
Fort Wood	14.3	Fort Jackson	70.0
Fort Sill	14.2	Fort Wood	5.0
Fort Bliss	14.3	Fort Sill	5.0
Fort Ord	57.1	Fort Bliss	10.0
		Fort McClellan	5.0
		Fort Hood	5.0
Anchorage		Miami	
Fort Bliss	33.3	Fort Jackson	65.4
Fort Lewis	66.7	Fort Wood	7.7
Guam		Fort Sill	7.7
Fort Ord	100.0	Fort Bliss	7.7
		Fort McClellan	3.8
		Fort Hood	7.7
Montgomery		Charlotte	
Fort Wood	5.9	Fort Knox	16.7
Fort Benning	50.0	Fort Wood	6.7
Fort Sill	8.8	Fort Sill	10.0
Fort Bliss	8.8	Fort Bliss	6.7
Fort Gordon	11.8	Fort McClellan	3.3
Fort McClellan	2.9	Fort Bragg	56.7
Fort Hood	11.8		
Atlanta		Raleigh	
Fort Wood	5.6	Fort Knox	17.4
Fort Benning	50.0	Fort Wood	8.7
Fort Sill	8.3	Fort Sill	8.7
Fort Bliss	8.3	Fort Bliss	4.3
Fort Gordon	13.9	Fort McClellan	4.3
Fort McClellan	2.8	Fort Bragg	56.5
Fort Hood	11.1		

	Percent		Percent
Shreveport		Kansas City	
Fort Wood	6.7	Fort Wood	10.0
Fort Sill	6.7	Fort Sill	7.5
Fort Bliss	13.3	Fort Bliss	10.0
Fort McClellan	6.7	Fort McClellan	2.5
Fort Polk	53.3	Fort Polk	52.5
Fort Hood	13.3	Fort Hood	17.5
Dallas		Minneapolis	
Fort Wood	7.3	Fort Jackson	38.6
Fort Sill	7.3	Fort Wood	6.0
Fort Bliss	9.8	Fort Sill	6.8
Fort McClellan	2.4	Fort Bliss	9.1
Fort Polk	46.3	Fort McClellan	4.5
Fort Hood	26.8	Fort Hood	15.9
		Fort Lewis	18.2
Houston		Sioux Falls	
Fort Wood	7.7	Fort Wood	9.1
Fort Sill	7.7	Fort Sill	9.1
Fort Bliss	10.3	Fort Bliss	9.1
Fort McClellan	2.6	Fort Hood	18.2
Fort Polk	46.2	Fort Lewis	54.5
Fort Hood	25.6		
San Antonio		Denver	
Fort Wood	6.3	Fort Wood	6.1
Fort Sill	9.4	Fort Sill	9.1
Fort Bliss	9.4	Fort Bliss	9.1
Fort McClellan	3.1	Fort McClellan	3.0
Fort Polk	46.9	Fort Hood	18.2
Fort Hood	25.0	Fort Lewis	54.5
Amarillo		El Paso	
Fort Wood	11.1	Fort Wood	9.1
Fort Sill	11.1	Fort Sill	9.1
Fort Bliss	11.1	Fort Bliss	27.3
Fort Polk	44.4	Fort Hood	18.2
Fort Hood	22.2	Fort Ord	36.4

	Percent		Percent
Salt Lake City		Little Rock	
Fort Wood	6.7	Fort Wood	5.9
Fort Sill	6.7	Fort Sill	5.9
Fort Bliss	6.7	Fort Bliss	5.9
Fort McClellan	6.7	Fort McClellan	5.9
Fort Hood	20.0	Fort Polk	58.8
Fort Lewis	53.3	Fort Hood	17.6
Spokane		Fargo	
Fort Wood	9.1	Fort Wood	9.1
Fort Sill	9.1	Fort Sill	9.1
Fort Bliss	9.1	Fort Bliss	9.1
Fort Hood	18.2	Fort Hood	18.2
Fort Lewis	54.5	Fort Lewis	54.5
Jackson		Omaha	
Fort Wood	6.7	Fort Wood	5.9
Fort Sill	6.7	Fort Sill	5.9
Fort Bliss	6.7	Fort Bliss	5.9
Fort McClellan	53.3	Fort McClellan	5.9
Fort Hood	20.0	Fort Hood	17.6
		Fort Lewis	58.8
New Orleans		Seattle	
Fort Wood	6.9	Fort Wood	8.3
Fort Sill	6.9	Fort Sill	8.3
Fort Bliss	10.3	Fort Bliss	8.3
Fort McClellan	3.4	Fort McClellan	4.2
Fort Polk	58.6	Fort Hood	12.5
Fort Hood	13.8	Fort Lewis	58.3
Oklahoma City		Oakland	
Fort Wood	7.7	Fort Wood	6.7
Fort Sill	7.7	Fort Sill	8.3
Fort Bliss	7.7	Fort Bliss	8.3
Fort McClellan	3.8	Fort McClellan	3.3
Fort Polk	61.5	Fort Hood	15.0
Fort Hood	11.5	Fort Ord	16.7
		Fort Lewis	41.7

	Percent		Percent
Los Angeles		San Diego	
Fort Wood	7.9	Fort Wood	6.7
Fort Sill	7.9	Fort Sill	6.7
Fort Bliss	7.9	Fort Bliss	13.3
Fort McClellan	3.4	Fort McClellan	6.7
Fort Hood	15.7	Fort Hood	13.3
Fort Ord	57.3	Fort Ord	53.3
San Juan		Tampa	
Fort Jackson	57.1	Fort Jackson	56.5
Fort Wood	4.8	Fort Wood	8.7
Fort Sill	4.8	Fort Sill	8.7
Fort Bliss	9.5	Fort Bliss	8.7
Fort McClellan	4.8	Fort McClellan	4.3
Fort Hood	19.0	Fort Hood	13.0